INTRODUCTION

What role will Europe play in a globalizing world of promise and peril? Clearly the question is an important one. This is the case not only because Europe is significant in itself, but also because globalization is making events in individual regions relevant to how the world as a whole evolves. As the President's *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (1999) said, globalization is accelerating the cross-border flow of trade, finances, technology, ideas, and information, thereby drawing the far corners of the earth into a growing web of interdependent ties—in ways that bring both opportunity and danger.[i] What happens in Asia can affect the entire globe. The same applies to a wealthy and powerful Europe, for its future will affect the world's future as well. Because today's world is so fluid, and so capable of moving in good directions and bad, Europe's impact will matter.

As this study argues, Europe's role in the global strategic calculus is undergoing a momentous change that will require skilled handling if its bright promise is to be fully realized. Europe is steadily unifying, transforming itself into a continent of peaceful prosperity and eliminating its old role as a main instigator of worldwide war. If this achievement is fully attained—much will depend upon how Europe conducts its internal affairs over the coming decade—it alone will greatly advance the cause of world peace. But this need not be Europe's only worthy role. As it achieves unity, Europe will confront the growing challenge of acting outside its borders, in distant areas where its economic and security interests are at stake. If it surprises critics by developing the willpower and capacity to act more powerfully there than now, it will be able to play a constructive role of growing potency on the world stage as well.

Whether Europe will succeed in both endeavors is to be seen. Predestination is not at work here. Europe faces a welter of difficult policy challenges, and if it does not handle them well, a different, less-promising future could unfold. If it acts unwisely in its internal affairs, Europe could bungle its further unification, emerging as a continent with still-serious problems. Even if it fully unifies, Europe might remain inward looking, consumed with itself and detached from world affairs. Or it might emerge with an outward-looking policy that serves Europe's strategic conceptions, but not necessarily larger global causes or U.S. interests. Because these negative futures are plausible, avoiding them will require sensible policies. The Europeans have shown a capacity to act sensibly, and they likely will do so again, but not without a great deal of anguished debate and struggle of the sort that has come to mark modern-day European politics.

Because the United States will be an influential actor, it too faces a challenge: that of surmounting its ambivalence by reacting wisely to Europe's transformation in ways that encourage positive changes and discourage negative trends. In order to advance its own interests, the United States has ample reasons to support Europe' unification within the transatlantic partnership, and to encourage it to play an energetic, constructive role in global security and economic affairs. A peaceful Europe means that the United States no longer will have to worry about the continent going up in smoke, and it may gain the added advantage of stronger European help—including military help—in other regions. If the United States is left to act alone as the world's sole superpower, it likely will find itself

overextended, and maybe overwhelmed, by global affairs. But if Europe's power can be harnessed to work in harmony with the United States, the two of them together should be able to accomplish a great deal, thereby making the future brighter for the entire world.

In developing this thesis of promise and challenge, the following two chapters examine key issues surrounding Europe's transformation and its effects on transatlantic relations. These issues are heavily political and economic, but because security relationships and defense capabilities are still quite important, they are also military. Chapter I analyses the complex political and economic changes taking place in Europe, the difficult policy changes that are arising in its quest for unification in the coming years, and the uncertain prospects for Europe turning outward. Chapter II addresses an equally thorny matter: the military reforms that the Europeans will face if they are to play a more active role in security and defense affairs in and around their continent. Irrespective of their political willingness to look outward, the Europeans will not be able to act effectively if they lack the physical means to do so, including military forces that can project power and operate with U.S. forces better than now. This chapter puts forth a defense agenda that can help allow the Europeans to build their own identity in this realm, while also empowering NATO's ability to perform new missions in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The United States and Europe won the Cold War by working together on behalf of a common strategic vision. Over the past decade, they have continued doing so: not perfectly, but well enough to make considerable progress. Will they be able to do so again in the coming years, in ways that help tame not only Europe but the globalizing world, thereby making it safer for democracy and wealthier to boot? Only time will tell, but a new frame of reference for thinking about the future is emerging. Only a few years ago, the idea of Europe both unifying and playing a powerful role outside its borders was dismissed as wishful thinking. The idea may still be controversial and conditional. But owing to the transformation occurring in Europe, it is no longer merely wishful and it may not be premature either. A major issue for the coming decade is whether Europe will complete the building of its own house while rising to the challenge of helping shape the globalizing world. The future of the transatlantic partnership rests on this issue.

CHAPTER I

EUROPEAN UNIFICATION:
PROSPECTS, CHALLENGES, AND GLOBAL CONSEQUENCES

Europe often does not figure prominently in the recent literature on globalization, which tends to focus on other regions, especially Asia and Latin America. Yet Europe remains hugely important to world affairs and to how globalization plays out. In contrast to other regions that face serious troubles in their security affairs and economics, Europe is steadily making progress in these and other critical areas. This progress is not readily seen when attention is focused on the dust and smoke of Europe's daily political tussles. But it becomes apparent when the trends over the years and decades are examined. Europe has progressed a great deal since 1990; indeed, since 1995. It is not only removing what earlier had been a huge thorn in the side of global tranquility, but in some ways, it also provides an example for other regions to follow. If Europe's distant and tumultuous past becomes replicated elsewhere, the future is headed toward big trouble. But if Europe's bright promise today can act as a path-setter, the future is something to be welcomed.

While Europe is making progress, it faces several important issues--not only in economics, but also in politics and security affairs--that will have to be handled carefully if its glowing promise is to be fully realized. Moreover, the looming strategic task is no longer figuring out how to make Europe peaceful. Instead, it is determining how the strength of a unifying Europe can be harnessed, in partnership with the United States, to help bring stability and progress to the rest of the globalizing world. Precisely because Europe is no longer an all-consuming source of conflict and war, it can no longer be viewed as an island separate onto itself.

Dynamics of Progress and Unity in Europe

The dominating reality today is that aside from the Balkans, Europe is not only basking in peace and prosperity, but steadily unifying. Prosperity is nothing new for Europe: it has long been one of the world's most industrialized and richest regions, second only to North America. But peace and unity are decidedly new. Throughout most of the 20th century, Europe was the cockpit of global calamity, spawning two world wars and the Cold War. This unseemly track record reflected Europe's main geostrategic feature: its fragmented division into a large number of medium and small-sized states, all living in close proximity, and many distrusting each other intently. As far back as the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the consequence was endless geopolitical maneuvering in which many countries were pitted against each other and seldom cooperated on behalf of enduring collective solutions. For the Europeans, falling into conflict and war--by accident or design--came naturally.

The stage for the 20th century's disasters was set by the events of the late 19th century. Across the Atlantic, the United States surmounted its divisive Civil War of the 1860's to achieve both industrialization and political unity as a full-fledged democracy. As a result, it became strong, wealthy, and peaceful, poised to enter the 20th century as a world power.

Europe also experienced war during the mid-1800's: the Crimean war, and three wars triggered by Germany's unification. But it did not emerge from them as fortunate as the United States. Europe industrialized but only partly democratized: while its western countries steadily embraced democracy, its eastern countries remained mostly authoritarian. Europe's security system remained unsteady: a shifting morass anchored in military strength and tactical diplomacy, rather than common interests, values, and laws. As unified Germany grew stronger, Europe's other dominant powers--Britain, France, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and Russia-- maneuvered to protect their positions and used their industrial power to build modern armies capable of attacking each other. Europe drifted into a balance of power system. At first this system seemed stable, with Germany and Britain playing contributing roles on behalf of peaceful order. But as nationalism took hold, and as diplomatic intrigue gave way to military competition, this system mutated into a bipolar rivalry and became increasingly fragile.[ii]

The 20th century dawned with many Europeans expecting a long era of peace and progress. But lured by economic and political atmospherics into ignoring their shaky security system, they were blind to the danger facing them. In 1914, the balance of power system collapsed, producing World War I, which inflicted huge damage and broke the back of Europe's optimistic spirit. As Britain's Sir Edward Grey said, the lights went out across Europe and they were not to be relit again soon.[iii] For a time in the 1920's, Europe seemed to be recovering its balance in a setting where no major security threats loomed. But the bitter legacy of World War I left too many wounds for true cooperation to take hold, and a number of countries fell victim to short-sighted conduct that failed to prepare for the gathering storm. That brief period gave way to the Great Depression of the 1930's, political extremism in the form of nazism, fascism, and communism, and ultimately another catastrophic explosion: World War II. Whereas World War I was heavily triggered by diplomatic accident along with interacting war plans that produced an unintended rush to calamity, World War II was an intended product of evil menace: Nazi Germany's imperialist and racist designs. That long war finally ended in 1945 with Germany's defeat, but it left Europe devastated and the Soviet Army implanted in Eastern Europe, where Stalin was free to impose his own totalitarian order while threatening a further march westward. As a result, Europe plunged into another stressful political conflict: the Cold War. That conflict never erupted into a shooting war, but for forty years, Europe was divided down the middle in a new bipolar rivalry pitting the Soviet-led bloc against the U.S.-led NATO in a nerve-wracking standoff. Meanwhile West Europeans, exhausted from decades of self-inflicted conflict and destruction, struggled to regain their footing and their self-confidence.

The political track that Western Europe took, under the mantle of U.S. protection, was a slow but steady pursuit of unification that not only restored its health but also played a major role in eventually winning the Cold War. This process long preceded the appearance of globalization on the world stage, but it reflected some of globalization's current dynamics. The process took its first giant step when Western Europe and the United States joined together in 1949 to create NATO, which soon grew to provide a rock-solid foundation of collective defense and security. NATO performed three key functions: 1.) It drew the United States into permanent involvement in Europe's security affairs; 2.) It kept the Soviet Union and communism at bay; 3.) It provided a mechanism for Germany, France, and Britain to bury their hatchets and begin cooperating together in security affairs. Prior to NATO, the

United States had adopted an arms-length stance toward Europe's peacetime affairs, and the European countries mostly competed against each other in the military arena. Because of NATO, the Americans were now heavily involved, and the West Europeans were now cooperating, not competing.

With NATO keeping their security intact, West European countries were freed to focus on their economic recovery. They were aided by the visionary Marshall Plan, which not only helped trigger industrial renewal but also stabilized Europe's endangered democracies. Even once-authoritarian Germany emerged as a stable democracy with a policy of multilateral collaboration. Soon the Europeans began cooperating together in the economic arena. First came the European Coal and Steel Community. Then came the Rome Treaty and Common Market of the 1950's and 1960's. Then came the European Economic Community (EEC) of the 1970's and the European Community (EC) of the mid-1980's. At first, the EC lacked strong powers, and was focused mostly on creating freer trade and coordinating currency values and finances. But the Single European Act was adopted in 1987, and after the Cold War ended, the EEC gave way to the European Union (EU). As a result of its Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties of the 1990's, the EU embraced the ambitious goals of achieving a monetary union and then a political union. The legacy of the 1990's is the EU of today: poised not only to continue deepening internally, but also to create a common foreign, security and defense policy (CFSP and ESDP), and to enlarge steadily into Eastern Europe.[iv]

Explaining Europe's Success. Sir Edward Grey was right in saying that when Europe's lights went out in 1914, they would not come back on again for many years. But at long last, nearly a full century later, they are being relit. Although much remains to be done, the contrast between yesterday and today could not be more dramatic. Throughout most of the 20th century, Europe was the poster-child of disunity, strategic chaos, and war. Now it has become the poster-child of unity, peace, and progress. The lengthy historical process of how this dramatic transformation occurred is common knowledge. The more interesting question is: Why did it occur? Why did it unfold so powerfully in the face of so many historical precedents pulling in the opposite direction? What are the core reasons for this profound change for the better? These questions are important because they have implications for how globalization's worldwide prospects are appraised. Europe was "globalized" long before this term became fashionable. For well-more than a full century, the small, densely packed European continent has been tied together in a growing web of interacting economics, finances, communications, politics, diplomacy, and security affairs. For many decades, Europe's mounting interdependency produced conflict and war. Now it is producing the exact opposite. What do the underlying causes of this full-scale turnabout have to say about how progress toward multilateral cooperation can best be pursued in a globalizing world?

A common explanation is that the Cold War threat posed by the Soviet bloc gave the Europeans no choice but to unify and to form an alliance with the United States. Clearly the Soviet threat gave them a big impetus, but whether it left them no other choice is another matter. They could have responded in different, less-integrated ways and still aspired to protect themselves. Indeed, plenty of critics argued against a fully integrated NATO, alleging it unduly provoked the Soviets and thereby intensified the contest. EC-EU integration also

had its critics, who charged that it unduly sacrificed the sovereignty of Europe's countries. In any event, creation of NATO and the EU, their full flowering, and their robust lives after the Cold War cannot be explained solely by the external threat to Europe. Other powerful factors, deriving from Europe's internal dynamics and the transatlantic relationship with the United States, were at work.

A key contributor was the strong U.S. commitment to Western Europe's security and prosperity. In addition to extending an umbrella of nuclear deterrence coverage over Europe, the United States provided the critical mass of power and leadership that enabled the large number of smaller European countries to join together to form an effective security coalition. Absent the United States, the political and military barriers likely would have been too difficult to overcome even if Western Europe's aggregate strength had been sufficient for an effective alliance. Equally important, the European countries, exhausted from their centuries of infighting, saw the wisdom of putting aside their long-standing hatreds in order to collaborate together. The fact that many of them already were democracies gave them common values, which further enhanced their propensity to cooperate. Germany's success at embracing democracy, achieved by the mid-1950's, was critical because it meant that all Northern and Central European members saw the political basics alike. By anchoring democratic Germany in a transatlantic defense alliance with the United States, NATO transformed Western Europe from its old, fatal balance-of-power dynamics into a truly collective enterprise aimed at promoting the common good.

For the first time, Britain, Germany, and France no longer had reason to fear each other. Indeed, the transatlantic defense bargain forged in the mid-1950's committed Britain, France, and the United States to West Germany's defense, in exchange for that country's pledge to fully integrate its rebuilt army into common defense plans. In the northern region, exposed Norway was assured of its security, and while Sweden chose to remain outside NATO, it benefitted from the reflected sunlight of NATO's stabilizing influence. In the southern region, Italy was given an influential role in NATO, exposed Turkey was brought into NATO and assured of its security, and efforts were made to dampen the never-ending Greek-Turkish rivalry. Something similar had been attempted by the League of Nations in the 1920's, but it foundered when its collective security pledges of political help in crises proved hollow. Learning from this painful lesson, NATO went a big step beyond by creating firm collective defense pledges of powerful military help not only in crises, but in peacetime as well. Especially because they were backed by U.S. military power, NATO's collective defense commitments were credible enough to be decisive. Western Europe's old geopolitics of maneuver and competition turned into a new, healthy geopolitics of mutual collaboration and multilateralism. In essence, collective defense helped turn the key, opening the door to a brighter future of restored progress.[v]

Owing to shared strategic interests and common political values across Western Europe and in the transatlantic relationship, the traditional fear that gains for some countries would spell losses for others steadily disappeared. All participants now had an incentive to see each other, and help each other, grow more secure and prosperous. Not only did cooperation bring peace among the Europeans, but it also enabled them to greatly magnify their strategic powers, thereby allowing them to pursue ambitious goals that otherwise would have been well-beyond their ken. NATO brought them considerable

security at relatively low cost, and the EC-EU played an important role in accelerating their economic progress. As the years unfolded, the costs and sacrifices of both institutions came to be vastly overshadowed by the gains achieved. As a result, the idea of integration became increasingly popular, as did both institutions, which came to symbolize much of what was new and good about Europe.

Another key contributor is that both NATO and the EC-EU acted as more than political debating societies and showcases for meaningless summits. They developed an ability to use the democratic process to make strong decisions, based on consensus, that not only made strategic sense but also respected the interests of all participants. During the 1960's and 1970's, NATO employed its democratic mechanisms to surmount dangerous political problems that arose as a result of its debates over defense strategy and détente. In 1967, it adopted the new defense strategy of flexible response, which harmonized its need for continuing nuclear deterrence with its growing imperative for a stronger conventional defense. In the early 1970's, it agreed to pursue a careful détente with the Soviet Union while further strengthening its defenses. A main effect was to keep West Germany's interests aligned with those of the United States and Britain: the anchor of NATO's effectiveness in the following years. As the Common Market evolved into the EEC and then the EC, it took similar harmonizing steps. Rejecting France's call for a separate path to European unity, it decided to pursue unity within the transatlantic partnership, and to open its door to a large number of qualified European countries, not just a small core.

Moreover, these two institutions developed the capacity to perform successfully in implementing their strategic decisions. This especially was true for NATO. From the earliest years onward, it created institutions--its political headquarters and its integrated military command--for actually carrying out concrete plans and programs. Owing to its ability to forge consensus behind a coherent strategic agenda, it became a powerful institution for assembling and employing the assets that were needed to achieve agreed-upon goals. Never a perfect alliance, it often generated intense frustration, but overall, it developed a reputation for effectiveness, often starting slowly on a new enterprise, but then finishing with a flourish. The EC-EU was slower to evolve along these lines. But from the start, West European policies helped lower trade barriers and facilitate flows of capital and finances in ways that enhanced economic progress for its members. Eventually, the EC-EU developed its own political organs and administrative bureaucracies that provided a growing capacity to plan and carry out ambitious programs on behalf of common goals.

Both institutions began gaining steam in the late 1970's, and as the 1980's unfolded, they both were operating at high throttle, thereby helping the western alliance steadily pull away from the Soviet bloc in power and purpose. Led by the Reagan Administration but with strong European support, NATO carried out major defense modernization efforts by deploying LRINF missiles and pursuing its Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) plan. The EC stepped up its community-building efforts even as European countries emphasized market reforms to stimulate their economies into faster sustained growth. Meanwhile the United States and Western Europe drew closer together in politics, economics, diplomacy, and defense affairs. The effect was to eliminate any lingering prospect that the Soviet Union somehow could prevail in the contest for mastery of Europe's destiny. Indeed, the Soviet Union was left bankrupt, presiding over a Warsaw Pact alliance that was discredited in

Eastern Europe and an outdated political-economic system that was discredited at home. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw the Soviet Army from Europe was not tactical: it reflected the new, irresistible strategic tides of the time.

When the Cold War ended suddenly in 1990, the Europeans were compelled to perform a strategic stock-taking. It hardly came as a surprise that, with U.S. support, they wanted to continue cooperating and integrating: not only to prevent a damaging backslide into their regretful past, but also to march further along the path toward progress. They also wanted to retain both NATO and the EU as vital bodies. Although their original rationales had mutated, both institutions were seen as potent contributors to Europe's future visions. Because both institutions already were deeply implanted, the Europeans were not compelled by the new era to start over from scratch. Instead, they merely had to retool two institutions that already had a reputation for effectiveness and seemingly possessed the power and flexibility to adapt to the new era. The 1990's were mostly consumed with this agenda of retooling and adaptation. The record shows that considerable progress has been made. Today both NATO and the EU see themselves as productive, forward-looking institutions for the future, not outmoded relics of the past. Meanwhile, nearly all European countries have grown enchanted with the idea of taking advantage of an historic opportunity to unify their continent. Their common goal is not only to cement their peace, but also to make their continent wealthier and more secure on the world scene, thereby better-able to control its own destiny. In this setting, European unification has grown from a distant dream into a true political ideology, with a real agenda of its own.

Lessons Learned. What the future holds is to be seen, but looking back, the European drive to progress and integration had a distinct pattern of cause and effect. While the Europeans and Americans already had the advantage of a mostly shared commitment to democracy when the Cold War began, their growing political cooperation in the security and defense arena is what seemed to jump-start their march into the future on multiple fronts. Their multilateral defense collaboration did more than create a deterrent shield against the Soviet threat. It also lessened their apprehensions about each other, and made them increasingly comfortable with the idea of working together in ways that benefitted all of them: first in defense affairs, and then in other arenas. Former enemies came to see each other as valuable allies and partners: not only in wartime, but peacetime as well. Behind their defense screen, moreover, the secure political conditions were created that allowed democracy to deeply entrench itself nearly everywhere.

As for their efforts in the economic arena, their mutual commitment to recovery from World War II's devastation began at about the same time that NATO was formed. Virtually all countries recognized that they could not sustain their physical safety and their democratic values unless they reignited their economies. But while all European countries eagerly accepted Marshall Plan assistance from the United States and set about to rebuild their prosperity, their efforts to integrate their economies in ambitious ways did not get fully underway until later. The European countries worked within the Bretton Woods accords and participated in GATT negotiations aimed at lowering trade tariffs. But they mostly set about to manage their national economies, industries, and welfare policies in their separate, independent ways. In essence, transatlantic defense cooperation and NATO came first, and European economic integration came afterward. To an important degree, the former helped

empower the latter, not the other way around.

This pattern was the case because of necessity and opportunity. From the onset, the Europeans and Americans faced a critical need to work closely together in the security arena in order to protect their own safety. European economic integration was seen as a worthwhile vision in some quarters, but more as a future luxury, not an immediate necessity. Equally important, political consensus on both sides of the Atlantic formed early on behalf of security and defense cooperation. No such consensus existed for ambitious economic integration agendas. Both the Europeans and Americans soon came to value their security and defense cooperation so much that they did not allow growing economic frictions from market dynamics to pull them apart. By the early 1970's, Western Europe had recovered its industrial strength to the point where it was now becoming an economic competitor with the United States. Political frictions soon emerged, but both sides made the necessary adjustments in trade and currency relations that were needed to prevent their security collaboration from being damaged. Inside Europe, meanwhile, a similar dynamic unfolded. By the 1970's, Central and Northern Europe had pulled far ahead of Southern Europe in wealth and economic competitiveness. But rather than drifting apart because their economic lives were now so different, the Europeans decided instead to stick together by continuing to collaborate in NATO, and by gradually expanding the EC-EU southward to include new members as the situation permitted.

The great lesson of the past fifty years in Europe and transatlantic relations stands out like a beacon light on a dark night: Strong multilateralism is needed in order to transform big problems into major progress, and while it is not easy, it can work when serious-minded countries decide to take full advantage of its opportunities. Whether this model for achieving progress applies elsewhere can be debated, but it undeniably worked well in the European case over the past half-century, and its causal dynamics seem simple and clear. For the most part, common political values and security collaboration reinforced each other from the onset to create a solid foundation for community-building. Governmental policies, not markets, were the source of progress in building this foundation. To be sure, economic growth helped too, but more as a means to facilitate this collaboration, not a central mechanism of collaboration and progress in itself. In Europe, major economic integration was eventually pursued and is now being attained. But at the time when European unity was starting to take shape and for several decades afterward, its primary role was to provide the superstructure of progress, not the foundation.

Indeed, this mentality of seeking security arrangements as a still-important basis for pursuing progress in economics and politics remains alive today, more deeply implanted than many outside observers realize. When the Americans and Europeans start thinking about how to cooperate on a new endeavor, they typically turn first to political endeavors and security affairs, and only then to economics. Experience has taught them that this approach normally provides the best avenue not only to reach a common understanding, but also swiftly and effectively to achieve something truly enduring in more ways than one. It is no accident that when they decided to enlarge into Eastern Europe, they chose to expand NATO first and the EU afterward. NATO had the political capacity to move faster

than the EU, which is impaled on complex decision procedures and demanding admission requirements. In addition, there was a widespread belief that NATO enlargement could quickly lay down a foundation of security, thereby creating the conditions that would help encourage democracy and market reforms to take hold, in ways that would allow new members to qualify for eventual entrance into the EU.

Today Europe is well on the way toward achieving unity. In major ways, the increasingly visionary and powerful EU is leading the way. But the EU is no longer a purely economic and political body. Having learned the lesson that security still matters even in an era when no single big threat looms immediately on the horizon, it is transforming itself into a body capable of carrying out a coherent diplomacy and defense policy. Moreover, most European countries plan to retain NATO, with its heavy U.S. involvement, as their premier security architecture, within which the EU's growing capabilities are to be fitted. The overall plan is to build a unifying Europe through a network of interlocking institutions: NATO, the EU, OSCE, and others. Empowering them is to be a widely shared commitment of all participating countries, backed by the United States, to unity and progress in security, politics, and economics.

To some critics, the current European and transatlantic strategy for progress is too cautiously anchored in security. They argue that in today's world, security can be taken for granted, progress can best be made by focusing on economic prosperity and democratizing politics, and these gains can be achieved by relying on market dynamics and natural historical forces. But Europe has the benefit of knowing its checkered history. Within the past century, it twice has seen progress temporarily gain momentum on its own, attention to security foolishly fade into the background, and calamity then ensue in ways that were obvious in the aftermath, but not foreseen at the time. Owing to this history, Europe's current practice of being proactive and careful about handling peacetime security affairs in an era of dynamic, unpredictable change comes across as understandable and wise.

The current strategy, however, is not locked in the Cold War. The old model of pursuing progress by creating security first and economic cooperation afterward seemingly is giving way to a new, more-balanced model that is still a work of art in creation. The new model is not the polar opposite: economics first, and security afterward or not at all. Instead, it is a model of security progress and economic progress moving in tandem, in hand-in-hand fashion that takes into account their interplay, their different properties, and their mutually reinforcing qualities. This new model of NATO and the EU acting in strategic tandem seems a reasonable approach for building the future of growing unity in Europe and continued strength in the transatlantic partnership. After all, security and economics are different things: progress in one does not automatically beget progress in the other, but damage in one can cause damage to the other. In the final analysis, these two activities greatly affect each other to the point where they are two sides of the same coin. The new European and transatlantic model reflects this judgment, which arises from Europe's turbulent but successful history of the past fifty years. The question is whether this model, or some other model, provides a viable path to progress for other regions, which face problems of their own in a globalizing world.[vi]

Guiding Europe's Unification: Strategic Issues Ahead

Although Europe is pointed toward further unity and progress, its success should not be taken for granted. Much will depend upon how several critical issues are handled: the EU's internal development, further enlargement by NATO and the EU eastward, relations with Russia, troubled Balkan affairs, and Turkey's shaky status. The manner in which these strategic issues are resolved will affect not only the kind of unified Europe that emerges, but also its ability to play a contributing role on the world stage in partnership with the United States. A united, confident Europe that is master of its own destiny and able to act strongly in world affairs is one thing. Something else again is a dithering, inward-looking Europe, one so immersed in still-messy continental affairs that it cannot look outward, much less act there. Whether one or the other outcome unfolds will be determined by how Europe handles the key issues on its plate in the coming years.

Pursuing EU Integration. Beyond question, Europe approaches these thorny issues from a position of considerable economic strength. Today, Europe as a whole totals about 600 million people, a $10 trillion economy, and an average GDP per Head of about $17,000 annually. But these aggregate figures conceal the big differences among Europe's various subregions. Whereas wealthy Western Europe, with its 380 million people, has an average GDP per Head of nearly $26,000, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, with over 200 million people, are considerably poorer, averaging only about $4,500. Indeed, Turkey, a longstanding NATO member with 63 million people, barely tops $3,000 per person. Even across the western half of Europe, there is a considerable difference between the northern wealthy and the southern less-wealthy. Italy's economy is similar to that of its northern cousins, but Spain, Portugal, and Greece average only about $11,000 per Head, well below the overall average. Overall, Europe's economic growth has been slow for the past several years, albeit it has picked up recently. Europe's best-endowed economies--e.g., Germany and France--have been struggling with high unemployment, bloated welfare spending, and high wages that elevate the cost of their goods on foreign markets, thereby dampening exports. Although inflation has been low, national debt and budget deficits remain high, posing long-term problems. Nor have European businesses and industries responded to the information era with the same alacrity as American firms by downsizing, merging, and networking. All of these factors produce a sense of continuing economic struggle in Europe, albeit in a setting of far greater wealth and better living conditions than enjoyed by most other regions. [vii]

Europeans anticipate that the new Euro-currency will help stimulate their long-term economic growth and otherwise provide the benefits that come from a strong currency capable of influencing finances, capital flows, and investments inside and outside their continent. European economic and monetary union (EMU) took full effect in early 1999, when the new Euro made its initial appearance as one currency among the plethora of still-existing national currencies. To the surprise of skeptics, fully eleven EU members took part in the new currency, and a new Central Bank was created to help coordinate Europe's integrating monetary affairs. By 2002, the Euro is scheduled to replace most national currencies. Although it enjoys the support of Europe's main finance ministries and banks, thus far it has suffered ups and downs on international markets in relation to the dollar, the yen, and other currencies. Its adoption has been greeted not only with fanfare but also controversy. While it marks a major step toward Europe's unity in economic affairs, critics charge it will deprive individual countries of valuable flexibility in setting monetary and fiscal

policy in stressful situations. Fearing this constraint and resenting their own loss of identity, Britain and Denmark thus far have refused to adopt the Euro as their sole currency (Greece and Sweden have not yet qualified). Those countries that fully support EMU are struggling to make it work, but while difficulty lies ahead, the Euro is now a reality whose time has come not only because it enjoys considerable support, but also because, in the eyes of many Europeans, it makes economic sense. [viii]

A principal advantage of the Euro is that it will speed financial exchanges and lower transaction costs across Europe. It provides a strong mechanism for enforcing disciplined fiscal and monetary policies in all national capitals. Indeed, a number of countries had trouble reigning in their national debt and budget deficits enough to qualify for EMU entrance under its rules. Those that responded had a tough time adjusting, but they are now better off for the effort. The Euro reduces the instability that comes from fluctuating exchange rates among multiple currencies, eases the creation of multinational European businesses, and helps make European investments more attractive on the world scene. Its effects on exports and imports will depend upon its value in relation to other currencies, but it provides Europeans a greater sense of continuity in gauging the complicated dynamics of trade and financial flows. As the Euro takes hold, doubtless it will have a positive effect on Europe's economic growth, but the extent of the impact is to be seen. In the coming years, a wealthier Europe likely will continue its steady march toward becoming a single market with one dominant currency. At that juncture, the central issue will be whether Europe acts as an inward-looking regional economic bloc, or instead uses its growing cohesion to play an active, participating role in guiding the world economy as a whole.

Now that EMU and the Euro are being implemented, the main challenges facing Europe's drive to unification are more political than economic: they deal with the fundamentals of governance rather than the orchestration of money and markets. [ix] Achieving economic integration has been difficult enough, but it is less ambitious than pursuing major political integration. The task facing the Europeans is very different from that faced by the United States when it unified more than a century ago. The United States had the advantage of beginning as a small set of colonies located on the eastern seaboard. At the onset, it was able to create a constitution, a dominant political culture, and a single approach to governance, and then replicate this approach as it marched westward to populate its wide-open continent, spawning a growing number of like-minded states in the process. Europe's situation is the exact opposite. The continent already is fully settled, marked by a large number of deeply-entrenched countries with their unique histories, cultures, identities, respective sizes and strengths, and views about sovereignty. The task is made easier because nearly all countries are full democracies with market economies and modern societies. Yet Europe is far from a uniform place: while homogenous in some respects, it is still highly heterogeneous in others, and each country is left with its own needs, priorities, and instincts. This setting makes the task of creating a common approach to governance, and to the distribution of political power and authority, a truly daunting one. The inevitable consequence is an integrative effort that moves slowly, builds consensus from the bottom up, and gradually adds more powers to the union as it proves its ability to govern fairly and effectively.

The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties proclaimed that the EU is to become an

ever-closer political union, but exactly what does that term mean? Europeans have been debating this question intently since then, with no end in sight to the competing arguments and diverse theories. The two treaties pointed the EU on a slow upward trajectory in this arena, but did not specify the exact end game. Countries favoring the enterprise--e.g. Germany, France, and their neighbors--began talking in terms of visionary horizons. But a negative reaction soon took hold in Britain, Denmark, and some other members. The result was agreement on the principle of "subsidiarity", which states that powers not definitely needed by the EU are to be left in national hands. Another concept has been "flexibility", which holds that some members might band together to pursue union in various arenas to greater degrees than other countries. These and other such concepts allegedly put brakes on centralizing authority in Brussels and provide room for different paths to political integration.

Even so, they have not halted the EU's momentum toward greater internal unity and deepening in recent years--as evidenced by a steady stream of visionary proclamations coming from EU summits and ministerials, each often outdoing its predecessor in boldness. Nor have they blunted the EU's involvement in a growing array of policy issues, including public health, environment, justice, agriculture, education, job creation, fisheries, energy, and transport. Especially now that Britain has become a more enthusiastic member under the Blair government, the EU Commission, Council of Ministers, and Parliament have grown stronger and more ambitious. This trend especially applies to domestic affairs, but the EU is now branching out to create a common foreign and defense policy, complete with regular summits, diplomatic and military staffs, and plans to create a modest-sized EU military force for Petersberg tasks, including peacekeeping and peacemaking.[x] The decision to move toward a robust ESDP has been ratified in accords at St. Malo, Cologne, and Helsinki. Doubtless, additional agreements will follow in the coming years.

Precisely where this trend will lead, and at what speed, is uncertain. Most Europeans commonly talk of a future in which they unify, but in a manner that fully respects the still-important rights and identities of each sovereign country. What they are less clear about is exactly how this precarious balancing act is to be carried out so that unity and diversity live happily together under the same roof. The reality is that a "political union" can mean many things, and its definition can mutate over time. At a minimum, it could mean a loose union of countries that preserve their full sovereign rights over strategic decisions in domestic and foreign policy, but meet regularly to forge consensus on common matters and employ EU institutions to carry out some of their policies. At the other end of the spectrum is a full-scale federation, in which the EU acquires a single omnibus constitution for all its members, a fully empowered federal government is created, and Europe's nations become the equivalent of states in the United States. Both extremes seem implausible. The idea of a loose political union underestimates what Germany, France, and other influential countries have in mind. But the idea of a full federation anytime soon appears more ambitious than most countries are willing to contemplate at the moment. Currently the EU's budget is only a tiny portion of total government spending and it does not seem likely to grow greatly in the coming years. The EU, thus, will lack the control over major resources that is a hallmark of a truly powerful state.

This leaves a tight political union, or some form of strong confederation, as a likely

target for the coming decade and somewhat beyond. Although many European countries seemingly agree with this idea, they often fall into disputes when the details are discussed. For example, Germany and France are now discussing a joint effort to lead a cluster of countries farther along the path of political integration than being pursued by other EU members. But whereas Germany wants the EU's executive and administrative agencies to become more powerful, France wants future EU powers embedded in the legislature, where they can be directly influenced by national capitals. These two countries are far from the only actors with visions of their own, including differing attitudes toward majority rule and veto powers. Britain has its own instincts, as do the Low Countries, the northern countries, the southern countries, and prospective new members from the east. The future will depend upon what the political traffic of consensus-building will bear.

Critics decry the alleged sheer hopelessness of the enterprise. But the record shows that because the instinct to unify has grown stronger over the years, a great deal more progress has been made than anything that seemed possible at each stage of the enterprise. The continuing pattern has been one in which the Europeans wallow in fractious debates for a few years, but at the critical juncture, rise above the clamor by making sensible decisions to move a few steps farther down the path of integration. As Europeans know, the United States owes its strength and health heavily to its unity. Well-aware of this history, most Europeans want to take advantage of the historic opportunity at their doorstep to create the kind of stronger political union that works for them. For as long as this widespread consensus exists, further political integration seems in the cards. The effort likely will lose steam only when a prevailing consensus is reached that sufficient benefits have been achieved and further integration would be more trouble than it is worth, or not provide added gains that exceed the costs. Where and when this equilibrium point will be reached is uncertain, but clearly it lies in the distant future, not tomorrow.

The bottom line is that Europe is not creating a new super-state anytime soon, but it is adding a potent layer of government and economic management atop its system of many countries. Critics worry that centralization ignores globalization's call for decentralization, that further bureaucratization will be stultifying, and that cultural homogenization will deprive Europe of its charm. The prospect of Brussels-based bureaucracies regulating Europe's wine and cheese industry--to say nothing of its entire economy--adds some weight to these complaints. But Europeans, who are familiar with bureaucracy and regulation, seem to be taking such things in stride. Experienced in the perils of disunity and dead-set against any reappearance of crippling nationalism, they have their own approach to handling globalization's pressures in their region. The challenge facing them will be to balance unity imposed from atop with healthy diversity bubbling up from below.

Whether and how today's debates inside Europe will give way to a new consensus on additional steps toward integration is to be seen. If the past is prologue, the EU will continue acquiring greater powers in the coming years, but in slow and evolutionary ways. In the meantime, Europeans will continue debating, arguing, and jostling over how political unity is to unfold. The practical consequence could be that so much time, energy, and political chips are spent on defining the EU's future that many European countries have few resources left over for other endeavors. Self-absorption has been far from uniformly true or totally stifling in recent years: e.g., the Europeans are enlarging NATO and the EU, and they

have risen to the occasion in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yet self-absorption often has been a noticeable pattern, and if it continues, it could result in Europe continuing to be mostly inward-looking, not outwardly active.

Once unification reaches its final destination, it may transform Europe into a big and powerful continent capable of acting with far greater purpose and despatch than now. This is the ultimate strategic payoff of unification, provided it produces a Europe that acts for the general good of mankind, not solely on behalf of its own interests and causes. But until then, a looming risk is that the EU and Europe might remain as hesitant, cautious actors, with only a few countries (e.g., Britain) willing and able to strike out on their own in specific situations. If so, this trend will enhance the importance of retaining NATO as Europe's premier security architecture, for it has a proven capacity to act decisively when the chips are down. In any event, the Europeans will need to balance their unification efforts with their larger responsibilities on their continent and around the world. Doing so will be one of the biggest challenges facing them in the coming years.

Enlarging Eastward. Although the EU's internal development is important, the further enlarging of NATO and the EU may have even bigger strategic consequences. Enlargement by both institutions has already begun. The idea was new and unsettling a few years ago. NATO took five years to adopt and begin implementing it. The EU took even longer by not only putting applicants through years of pre-accession negotiations on technicalities, but also squabbling internally over the EU's budget, common agriculture policy, and institutional adaptions to enlargement. But since then, initial steps have been successful, many East European countries are showing that their political and economic reforms are enduring, and both NATO and the EU are getting comfortable with the enterprise. The issue now is: Where is enlargement headed, and what is to be its ultimate destination? A future that includes only a few East European countries in NATO and the EU will be one thing. A future of nearly all such countries in these institutions will be something quite different: not only for the new members, but for NATO and the EU as well, for they will be much larger and more far-flung than now.

Regardless of what transpires, enlargement decisions will play a major role in determining Europe's overall unity as well as its future stability, peace, and progress. These decisions involve the United States, and they necessitate difficult judgments about who should belong to Europe's premier bodies and under what conditions they should be allowed to join. Both NATO and the EU will have a wide range of options at their disposal. The option that they select likely will be influenced heavily by their core strategic purposes for enlarging and their visions of the kind of NATO, the EU, and Europe they are trying to create. Especially since the politics of the matter create a great deal of blinding smoke, being sensibly clear about purposes and visions is necessary but far from easy.

Enlargement came to be a key strategic initiative of the United States, Germany, and other European leaders for a powerful reason. These governments felt that the vast zone stretching from the Baltics to the Balkans--especially Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)--could not be left out in the cold. Doing so would leave aspiring democracies there vulnerable to the internal instabilities and geopolitical vagaries that so often had consumed them in the past, in ways that damaged Europe as a whole. A judgment was reached that by enlarging

into this region, the goals of promoting democracy, markets, and peaceful security affairs could be decisively advanced. Even so, enlargement provoked controversy when it first began gaining steam in the mid-1990's. In the United States, EU enlargement was widely applauded, but NATO enlargement triggered strong protests from critics who feared that Russia would be unduly offended or NATO would be unwisely diluted. In Western Europe, by contrast, NATO enlargement was widely accepted, but EU enlargement triggered less enthusiasm because it meant absorbing new members with weak economies. Ultimately governments on both sides of the Atlantic agreed that NATO and the EU should enlarge broadly in tandem: not in identical ways, but in similar strategic terms. The reason is that the two institutions perform different functions and have complementary capabilities that do not substitute for each other. Whereas NATO provides defense and security, the EU provides economic and political integration. Because both contributions are needed, the prevailing theory held, enlargement by both institutions is required, and together they will have a powerful magnifying effect. [xi]

For obvious reasons, East European countries showed enthusiasm for joining both bodies and promptly applied for admission to them in large numbers. NATO began the enlargement process by admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. It is now appraising the applications of nine other countries, all of whom participate in the PfP and MAP programs: the three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Albania. The EU has not yet admitted new members, but it is now negotiating with thirteen candidates: the three Baltic countries, all five CEE countries, Bulgaria and Slovenia, plus Malta, Cyprus, and Turkey. How many of these applicants will gain admission is to be seen, but if all are eventually admitted, both NATO and the EU will grow in big ways. Whereas today NATO has 19 members and the EU has 15 members, an open-ended enlargement will leave both with fully 28 members. Moreover, both NATO and the EU will find themselves heavily imprinted on all three subregions of the Baltics, the CEE region, and the Balkans. Indeed, there will be few parts of Europe's heartland that they do not cover.[xii]

The idea of a dual NATO-EU enlargement this big finds its appeal in the vision of unifying nearly all of Europe in its entirety: lock, stock, and barrel. One such approach favored by some is that of a single "big bang" NATO enlargement in which most or all applicants would be invited to join, as a group, sometime soon. Regardless of whether NATO moves in one step or several, the EU's enlargement likely will be more deliberate, but if this ambitious vision is adopted, all viable applicants likely will join it as well. A first group of seven countries joining the EU might be led by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; a second group of six countries might be led by Romania and Bulgaria, with Turkey coming last. Short of a big bang, the process for both bodies might begin in 2002-2003, intensify during 2005-2007, and finish by 2010 or thereafter. The exact timetable aside, the key point is that owing to actions by both bodies, a big enlargement, if pursued, will begin in the next few years and largely culminate during this decade: a fast pace for a strategic change this major. In essence, the effect would be to redraw the political and military map of Europe, removing the last residue of the Cold War, and organizing virtually the entire continent on the basis of western values and institutions.

Arguing against a big enlargement by both bodies--in one step or several stages

over a few years--is the cautionary judgment that NATO and the EU should move in slow, careful ways that suggest a measured response to Europe's natural, organic evolution. Otherwise, this argument holds, a big dual enlargement will be too ambitious and too shocking, coming across as a crude power grab at the expense of countries not invited to join, including wary Russia and even Ukraine, which allegedly might be driven into Russia's waiting arms. An equally potent part of this argument is that for reasons of their own, NATO and the EU must be selective and demanding about exactly who is allowed to enter the fold. This consideration alone sets up powerful roadblocks against a big enlargement, and thus far, it has found official expression in the policies of both NATO and the EU.

Both institutions have stated that while their doors are open, they will scrutinize applicants carefully, admitting them not because they want to join, but because they deserve to belong. NATO and the EU have not tabled joint criteria. But their implication of their separate stances is that new members must meet democratic standards in politics and economics, have persuasive reasons for joining, can fully meet the obligations of membership, can advance the interests of NATO and the EU, and can contribute materially to Europe's overall stability and prosperity. Because both NATO and the EU can afford to be choosy, they each bring their own cost-benefit calculus to decisions. Both have reason to sniff the political wind before they act, including the larger climate, not just the merits and demerits of the applicants. Both have reason to avoid becoming bloated or saddled with draining new members that subtract more than they add. Both have reason to enlarge slowly in bite-sized pieces so that new members can be properly absorbed without causing indigestion. NATO has an incentive to select new members that can produce security as well as consume it: i.e, countries that have strong military forces, occupy strategically important terrain, can physically be defended, will support the alliance's policies and strategies, and are willing to participate in new missions. The EU--whose technical standards are more elaborate than NATO's--has an incentive to admit new members that have strong, functioning market economies and stable democratic governments so that they support overall EU policies and do not drain its resources with endless demands for assistance.

While these standards make sense, they provide ample justification for scrutinizing candidates in multiple critical ways, and for foot-dragging if there is no burning reason to act. If these stiff-mind standards continue being applied, they dictate that NATO and EU enlargement likely will continue being slow and limited even if any lingering impulse to drag feet gives way to a more forthcoming attitude. A core reason is that larger atmospherics aside, most applicants fall down in one or more ways because of their shortfalls in government, economics, or military strength. Virtually all are still trying to recover from communist rule, and while their progress is encouraging, it is slow and sometimes checkered. Moreover, many are small countries that could acquire political influence in NATO and EU ruling bodies in excess of their contributions to either institution. On balance, countries from the CEE region present the most attractive resumes, but these resumes are far from unblemished. The Baltic countries are equally qualified, and perhaps more so, but their admission, especially to NATO, could inflame Russia. Small Slovenia offers plausible credentials, but the Balkan countries present more problems than opportunities. The main argument for admitting them is that the step could help prevent their region from going up in flames. The problem is that NATO and the EU could find themselves caught up in flames if they enter the Balkans, as it currently exists, in permanent deeply entangling ways.

Notwithstanding its rigorous technical standards and prudent instincts, the argument against a big enlargement often is criticized for lacking moral fiber and for failing to see the forest through the trees. Critics allege it discriminates against aspiring European democracies that are crying for help, do not deserve to be victimized by crass indifference, and might make a worthy contribution if given the chance. Critics further assert that the argument against big enlargement is so consumed by cautious passivity and shortsighted calculations of self-interest that it misses a golden opportunity to unify Europe, perhaps a fleeting one. In the final analysis, it would perpetuate two Europes: privileged insiders and unprivileged outsiders. Why, critics ask, should there be two Europes when one Europe is desirable and possible? How can the insiders ever be truly secure if outsiders are left vulnerable to the dangers of the new era? Why kowtow to weakened Russia's worst instincts if the effect is to leave part of Europe vulnerable to an eventual Russian reassertion of power and control over its neighbors? Why not unify Europe while working with Russia and Ukraine to ensure that their legitimate interests are respected and that a strong Europe supports their healthy progress in helpful ways?

Critics ask additional questions. Why should NATO and the EU enlarge only into situations where stability already exists when their raison d'etre, and powerful capacity, is to transform instability into stability? Why should aspirants be required to present air-tight credentials when this was not the standard for earlier admissions during the Cold War, and when membership would greatly aid their progress? Why would bodies of about 30 members be more difficult to lead and manage than already-large bodies of 15-20 members? Moreover, critics point out, NATO did not rise to prominence by being narrowly choosy and self-serving. It anchored itself in a moral vision, opened its doors to those who shared this vision and were able to join healthy or crippled, and acted accordingly. So, for that matter, did the EC-EU in its early stages. Now that these two bodies have reached adult maturity and embraced pragmatic conservatism, critics ask, have they so lost their youthful idealism and visionary spirit that they fail to recognize how progress is truly achieved or what Europe should stand for in the 21st century?

How are these two very different arguments--one favoring a big enlargement and the other against it-- to be appraised? Clearly both raise valid points, and neither is transparently triumphant over the other. They suggest the need for a reasoned compromise and a synthesis. Conceivably a new strategic theory can be forged that balances the imperatives of enlarging boldly with the incentives to behave prudently. Future enlargement policy need not be an "either-or" proposition of doing almost nothing or virtually everything. Perhaps a sensible theory will produce an enlargement that is neither small nor large, but instead medium-sized, and neither slow nor fast, but medium-speed. The EU might admit some countries, but not NATO, or the reverse. The result might also be a sequential approach to the subregions: admitting the CEE region first, then the Baltics, and finally parts of the Balkans. If additional countries eventually decide to apply, they can be considered on the strategic merits. If some countries are left out, perhaps their legitimate needs can be met in other ways. After all, membership in NATO and the EU may be important, but it is not a passport to heaven and, as Switzerland shows, its absence is not a one-way ticket to hell. Perhaps new, innovative ideas can be crafted for bringing security and prosperity to subregions that do not fully join NATO and the EU. If greater multilateral cooperation can be fostered in Northeastern and Southeastern Europe, this step will elevate

both regions and help qualify more countries for membership in the EU and NATO.

The idea of NATO and the EU remaining mostly anchored in the western side of Europe and only lightly engaging the eastern side lacks strategic vision and morality. Conversely the notion that both bodies must be extended to the far corners of Europe, in order for Europe to be whole, purchases one kind of moral vision at the risk of losing strategic wisdom. Implanting these two bodies everywhere is not necessarily an engine of progress or the hallmark of unity. Equally important, Europe's future depends upon these two bodies remaining vibrant. If Europe is to be peaceful and united, both NATO and the EU need to enlarge in ways that strengthen them, not overextend them or plunge them into undrainable swamps. A European unity that is defined in terms of its two key institutions will not be healthy if these two bodies are weakened by enlarging too far, too fast, trying to do too much, and attempting the impossible. The best kind of unity might be one in which these two bodies cover much of Europe, but not all of it, provided those remaining on the outside are provided ample opportunity and support to prosper as truly healthy European countries even if they do not belong to all of its key institutions.

All contending approaches need to be weighed carefully. The basic point is that NATO and the EU need more than technical standards and political wind-gauging to guide enlargement. They also need a coherent strategic theory of sensible goals and means, one that defines their future identities and Europe's essence in the long haul. In striving to avoid the risks of being too stingy or too indulgent, they need to avoid making enlargement decisions through bazaar politics, herd instincts, and impulses of the moment. In the final analysis, the political professionalism of the process may matter more than the size and timing of enlargement. Because there are good ways to enlarge and bad ways, the challenge is to pursue the former and avoid the latter. Since the proper path is unclear, the issues surrounding enlargement doubtless will be debated and studied in the coming years. The manner in which they are resolved will determine how Europe handles one of the hottest issues on its plate, and whether it emerges from the effort healthy or otherwise.

Dealing with Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey

These three issues create the troublesome side of Europe's drive to unity and future continental security politics. Of them, relations with Russia have undoubted strategic importance for Europe and the United States. A Russia that is their friend and partner will ease their agenda. A Russia that is sullen and angry about Europe's actions, and U.S. support for them, will create considerably less pleasant prospects. On the surface, Europe's relations with Russia seem tranquil, even encouraging. Summits and diplomatic exchanges occur regularly, information is flowing back and forth, symbolic political accords are being signed, trade and investment are growing, and above all, armies are not poised to attack each other. Beneath the surface, however, trouble may be taking shape. While the trends are unclear, the worrisome problem is that if events are not handled well by all participants, the future could evolve in the wrong direction. In the early 1990's, talk of warm partnership was in the air, and Russian policy endorsed the idea of an Atlanticist foreign policy. Since then, things have taken a turn for the worse, and Russian policy now speaks of its national interests, not Atlantic partnership. The Russians publicly blame the United States for their

global frustrations, but in Europe, it is the dynamic of European unity and enlargement that menaces their geostrategic conceptions. If a downward spiral takes hold, Russia will be the biggest loser, but Europe and the United States will suffer as well.

A core strategic change taking place is that by enlarging, Europe is absorbing countries and terrain occupied by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. When the Russian government withdrew its army from Eastern Europe, it proclaimed that the geostrategic zone between Germany and the former Soviet Union's borders should remain a neutral zone, free from alliances. The ongoing enlargement by NATO and the EU rebuffs this wish and expectation. The Russians complain most vociferously about NATO enlargement, but the strategic reality is that EU enlargement will also greatly reshape political, economic, and security affairs across this zone. After all, EU's ESDP and Helsinki defense goals mean that it will no longer be a purely economic and political bloc, but will have security visions and military teeth of its own. To Europeans, their dual enlargement eastward is a natural step that merely returns to the fold lands, countries, and cultures that were strongly European for centuries before the Cold War. To Russians, the act is not innocently natural, but an inherently geopolitical step that wipes away a still-valuable strategic buffer between them and their old menaces from Europe. Perhaps the Russians are guilty of old-think in the information age, but long experience in conflict and war over control of this zone has made them that way.[xiii]

The Russians complained angrily about NATO admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. But they agreed to live with the step when they were offered the Founding Act, a formal consulting relationship with NATO, PfP membership, and other assurances that their interests and influence in Europe would be respected. This enlargement by NATO, however, was a limited step. How will Russia react if, during the coming decade, both NATO and the EU spread out across all of Eastern Europe? What will happen if they go further eastward and enter the territory of the former Soviet Union, for example, by admitting the Baltic States into NATO and the EU, or developing greatly enhanced ties with Ukraine? Russian spokesmen already have said that such steps will cross the line of diplomatic acceptability. Evidently the Russians fear not only a U.S. presence too far eastward, but also the actions of Germany and Poland, neither of whom they trust. The prospect of all three countries joining together to alter strategic affairs along the old invasion corridors to Russia magnifies Moscow's concern. Whether the Russians fear this change out of a desire to protect themselves, or reassert their influence westward, or serve other purposes seems less important than the larger point. For reasons deeply embedded in their strategic calculus and national psyche, they are already unsettled about this prospect, and may become more disturbed as it becomes reality.

The matter might be less worrisome if Russia becomes a stable, confident democracy with a flourishing market economy and wealth-enhancing ties with Europe and the globalizing world. But such an outcome does not appear in the cards anytime soon. Currently Russia can best be portrayed as a quasi-democracy, with lingering but still-worrisome vestiges of authoritarian rule that could gain strength in the coming years. While its economy is partly privatized and reformed, it is far from a system of market capitalism: what stands out is its domination by plutocrats, monopoly corporations, and organized crime. Russia is suffering from a staggering loss of wealth in recent years: its GDP is well-

lower than under communism. Its economy is only slowly rebounding, its businesses are not competitive abroad, and its people are angry not only at their fate, but also at the democratic West, which it partly blames for their plight. To compound matters, the central government in Moscow faces the troubling prospect of several neighboring countries trying to pull away from its control, and republics and provinces across Russia trying to do so as well. Dampening this trend is hard because the Russian government no longer possesses the instruments of political and economic influence once at its disposal. Even Russia's army--the linchpin of its internal control and external influence--has fallen on hard times. What has evolved in and around Russia is a turbulent geopolitical ghetto. This situation prevents Russia from mounting a serious military and economic challenge to NATO and EU enlargement. But until things improve, it hardly puts Russians in a frame of mind to accept with sangfroid what is happening in this arena.

Are there solutions to the messy, trouble-filled relations with Russia that could lie ahead as enlargement unfolds? In theory, the obvious solution is to create a single democratic community that stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond, forging a huge bloc of like-minded values and visions. Such an enterprise seemed plausible in the early 1990's, but lately it has gone up in smoke, a victim of the decaying conditions, slow progress, and outright reversals being encountered in Russia. The strategic reality is that for the foreseeable future, Europe and Eurasia will be too different to become one community. Whether the self-focused Europeans and betrayal-minded Russians even contemplate this big step is a question mark. Regardless, Russia likely will not be joining the EU and NATO anytime soon, even though this idea is sometimes given high-level endorsement as a plausible distant goal. Russia cannot meet the EU's stringent entrance requirements, and Europeans are not about to provide the huge amounts of economic aid that would be needed for it to do so. Russia still regards NATO as an alien body to which it is not willing to give influence over its defense plans. NATO, owing to its preoccupation with defense plans, still keeps a wary eye on Russia. Even if this adverse psychology can be overcome, NATO likely will be unwilling to commit itself to defend Russia's border opposite China and Japan, and Russia will be unwilling to defend Europe from WMD threats arising in the Greater Middle East. Barring a sea-change in current conditions, such practical impediments make Euro-Russian unity implausible in the years ahead.

How about a two-community solution: a unifying Europe enjoying neighborly relations with a dissimilar but healthy Russian-led community in Eurasia? This idea seems more plausible than a one-community solution, and it may yet prove to be the best hope for an enduring stability. But as Samuel Huntington and others have pointed out, adjoining communities often have trouble being neighborly if they have greatly different values, beliefs, and expectations in their politics, economics, and culture. The result can be communal rivalry, not harmony.[xiv] Beyond this, a viable community is not now taking shape to the east. Russia is struggling to maintain its own cohesion, and while some Eurasian countries seemingly want close relations with Russia, others are trying to keep their distance or break away entirely. Those located closest to Europe are the most disinterested in the idea of a flourishing, Russian-led commonwealth in their region. For many, their hearts, minds, eyes, and pocketbooks are pointed toward Europe, not Moscow.

The strategic reality is that Europe is rising in strength and appeal, and at least for

now, Russia is falling. Whether Russia has bottomed-out is uncertain, but at best, its road back to power and prestige will be long and rocky. This dynamic will make it hard for Europe to put the brakes on enlargement even if it wants to reassure Russia of its place in the sun. To be sure, the United States and Europe can draw the line on NATO and EU membership so that Russia does not become further outraged about their encroachment eastward. But this hard-headed step could mean ignoring the legitimate interests and moral claims of countries that want to be a solid part of the new Europe, not left outside it. In any event, the growing eastward flow of European trade, finances, communications, values, and other appealing activities is a healthy trend that seems unstoppable. The Baltics, Ukraine, and several Caucasus states will be drawing closer to Europe irrespective of whether they join its key institutions. The inevitable effect will be to further unsettle Russia if it is left feeling that it is being isolated and pushed toward the Siberian tundra.

Perhaps Russia can be brought to accept the future changes graciously. But if not, Europe's unification and enlargement seemingly means that a messy relationship with Russia will evolve: not necessarily confrontation, but regular diplomatic friction coupled with genuine worry that parts of Eurasia could implode into violence and instability. Although the United States and Europe may not be able to solve the Russia problem, they can take practical steps to lessen it--in healthier ways than trying to buy off, appease, and otherwise mollify Russia through short-term gimmicks. As they pursue enlargement, they can show respect for Russia's legitimate security interests, while not sacrificing the interests of other countries. They can support further Russian reform by providing economic help and other aid, and by expanding trade and investments with it. They can consult with Russia on diplomatic issues, work with it to control crime and improve the environment, increase military-to-military ties, deal constructively with it in arms control negotiations, and help secure its nuclear material: steps already being taken today that will remain necessary tomorrow, and may need to grow stronger. Above all, they can acknowledge Russia's importance in the strategic firmaments. A strong Russia often has been a big problem in the past, but in today's world, Russia might become too weak for the West's own good: an effective and responsible Russian state is sine qua non for a stable Eurasian region capable of having neighborly relations with Europe. In any event, Bismarck once said that Russia is never as strong or as weak as she seems. His astute observation is worth remembering as the early 21st century unfolds.

The Balkans and Turkey also pose thorny problems for Europe's unity and progress. The subject is too complex for detailed treatment, but basic strategic issues merit a brief discussion. The Balkans remain a powder keg because Europe's dark history still lives in key places there: ethnic hatreds, angry nationalism, raw-boned geopolitical conduct, genocidal instincts, and no natural stabilizing mechanism. Like a century ago, Serbia remains a key trouble-maker, but it is not the only culprit in the region's ongoing saga of turmoil. During the Cold War, Europe could ignore the Balkans because it was imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain and Yugoslavia was under Tito's iron control. In today's world, the Balkans can no longer be treated as a distant dogpatch because its troubles can have a big ripple effect on Europe's overall health and on relations with other regions, including Russia, the Greater Middle East, and the Caucasus. As a result, Europe and the United States have been drawn into the Balkans. Like it or not, they now seem permanently entangled there. The challenge facing them will be to dampen Balkan fires rather than being consumed by these fires, as

happened to two past predecessors: the Turkish empire and the Austro-Hungarian empire.

Although the challenge includes bottling up Serbia while protecting Bosnia and Kosovo, a larger conception of Balkan stability and progress is needed. NATO and the EU seemingly have the right idea in their *Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe*, which focuses not only on today's peacekeeping, but also on using outside aid to help remedy the region's underlying problems: weak governments, endemic poverty, and frustrated societies. The prospect is far from hopeless, for unlike a century ago, the key neighboring countries are making encouraging progress: Romania, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Greece. Provided their progress is sustained, today's problem--ethnic warfare growing out of Yugoslavia's collapse and Serbia's brutal actions--seems containable. Precisely how the former Yugoslavia's ethnic fires can best be dampened, however, will be a conundrum at least until Serbia alters its aggressive course. One solution to ethnic fires is to let them die out because their fuels become exhausted, but these particular fires seem to be fanned by an inexhaustible supply of angry human emotions. Another solution is to separate the warring ethnic groups along territorial lines, but practical realities of intermeshed settlements in Bosnia and Kosovo seemingly make any extreme version of this step implausible. Perhaps the only viable solution is the current practice of using EU, NATO, and UN protectorates to try to sustain peace in these nascent multinational states. If so, the peacekeeping and nation-building task ahead seems a continuing one that will challenge U.S. and European skills, as well as their patience. [xv]

The risk ahead is that these ethnic fires will explode and spread outward to consume a bigger part of the Balkans, in ways that drag big powers into conflict with each other: e.g., NATO and Russia. But if these fires can be extinguished, or at least turned in cooling coals, the future of the Balkans and neighboring countries may be brighter than is commonly realized. Progress is slow, but the former Yugoslavia aside, democracy and multilateral cooperation are making genuine inroads. Weak economies remain a serious problem, but market practices are being adopted, and information-age capitalism is beginning to make its presence felt. If solid economic growth can be restored, a key barrier to progress will be lessened. Several Balkan countries are trying hard to qualify for membership in NATO and the EU, and eventually they might gain admission. In the best of circumstances, the Balkans are unlikely to match Europe's health for the foreseeable future. But they may be able to become a contributing part of Europe's unity and progress. If this is what the future holds, it will transform the Balkans' reputation as a cesspool and smoldering powder keg into something far better.

If the United States and Europe face a risk in becoming so consumed with the Balkans, it is that they will ignore equally important challenges in maintaining close ties with Turkey. That country has more people than the rest of the Balkans combined: 63 million versus 46 million. It is an important cultural bridge between Europe and the Islamic world. It stands at the strategic crossroads of Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Greater Middle East. It will play an important role in determining access to the Caspian oilfields and in fostering better Islamic relations with Israel. But as always, it remains an endangered country, vulnerable to internal political instability, poverty, Kurdish rebellions, and external aggression from several directions. Keeping Turkey aligned with the western democracies is vital. Losing it would be a strategic catastrophe. Yet its current

precarious position leaves it vulnerable to being lost, not because it might be conquered from outside or collapse from within, but because it might drift away from Europe in frustration at being left on the outside looking in.

As matters now stand, Turkey is not a key part of Europe's unification process. After years of complaining about being rebuffed, it is now being listed as a potential member of the EU. But it stands at the end of a long line of thirteen applicants, well-behind tiny Malta and Cyprus. If it gains admission, the step likely will not come for many years: well-after 2010, and maybe much later. Turkey's economic weakness and shaky politics are part of the reason, but also contributing are its troubled relations with Greece, continuing difficulties in Cyprus, and Europe's long-standing mentality of viewing Turkey as a non-European culture. Whether the current log-jam can be broken is to be seen, but this seems doubtful unless core political attitudes change. The bottom line is that while Europe is unifying, Turkey is not yet being integrated into Europe. Primary responsibility for keeping Turkey aligned with Europe and the democratic community will not lie with the EU. Instead, it will lie with the United States and NATO. Drawing Turkey into NATO's process of reform, adaptation, and preparations for new missions will be a key priority if this goal is to be achieved.

Keeping Turkey close to the West will be part of a larger challenge: dealing with the entire Mediterranean region, stretching from Gibraltar and North Africa to the Caucasus and Caspian Sea. The strategic importance of this long-turbulent 3,500 mile zone is growing because globalization is drawing the Greater Middle East closer to Europe. Whereas Europe is mostly profiting from globalization's economic dynamics, the Greater Middle East is not yet benefiting in appreciable ways. Indeed, the stresses arising from the Middle East's poverty, traditional societies, and unstable politics are being magnified by globalization's competitive forces and information-era changes. A backlash against the western democracies and their capitalist economics may be building there. In any event, the prospect of WMD proliferation in the Middle East and Persian Gulf poses an obvious threat to Europe, especially its southern countries.

Currently U.S. and European policies aim at stabilizing the Mediterranean region, while encouraging progress there. Their policies include EU and NATO cooperative outreach to North African states, encouragement of Greece and Turkey to settle the Cyprus conflict, outreach to the Caucasus, and efforts to arrange a favorable distribution of Caspian basin oil and gas while lessening tensions there. Whether this strategy succeeds, or instead the region slides into growing geopolitical turmoil, is to be seen. Much will depend upon the Israel-Arab peace process, the stability of Egypt and other western-leaning states, and globalization's uncertain effects on economic progress and political values. What can be said is the United States and Europe, which do not always see eye-to-eye there, will have their work cut out for them in dealing with Turkey and multiple other countries, all of which are struggling with old and new challenges of a globalizing world. Whereas this zone was often treated as Europe's backwater during the Cold War, it seems destined to become a hotbed of mounting attention in the coming years—in ways that will affect not only diplomacy and economic policies, but also the activities of U.S., European, and NATO military forces as well.

Europe's Role on the World Stage

The United States has ample reasons to welcome Europe's unification. True, some Americans have apprehensions that a strong and united Europe may turn into a strategic rival of the United States. But the ties that bind these two long-standing democratic allies seem far more powerful than any forces that might pull them apart in a wholesale way. Facing a still-dangerous world, a strong Europe will have no reason to become an adversary of the United States, for it will have little to gain and much to lose if they drift apart. Its imperative will be to remain allied with the United States in order to continue benefiting from close ties with it. The same logic applies to the United States, which stands to profit from remaining close to a strong Europe. For the United States, the problem with Europe in the past has been its weakness, not its strength: its vulnerability, its inability to defend itself, and its incapacity to act helpfully elsewhere. The effect has been to obligate the United States to protect Europe while depriving it of allies for security labor in other regions. Growing strength and unity by Europe promises to help lessen this problem, if not eliminate it altogether, thereby enhancing the value of a partnership with Europe. The bottom line is that as Europe's unity grows, these two long-standing partners will still need each other's support in many ways, and will not be able to afford alienating each other.

A uniting Europe does pose some problems for the United States. A united Europe will be a stronger economic competitor. It will have a mind of its own in world affairs. It may be harder to influence in such institutions as NATO, the WTO, the G-8, the IMF, and others. It may frustrate the U.S. agenda in foreign policy at times, and make the United States look less like the world's sole superpower. These drawbacks, however, are overpowered by two benefits from Europe's unity. First, Europe will be peaceful and capable of handling problems that arise on its home soil. Unlike the 20th century, the United States will no longer have to work hard at preserving stability in Europe. Nor will the United States be left perpetually nervous every time it acts strongly in another region, constantly looking over its shoulder in worry that Europe will unravel while its back is turned. The second benefit is that the United States may gain meaningful help from Europe at key places elsewhere around the world. If so, it will no longer have to act like an isolated superpower, carrying the world's burdens virtually alone. The first benefit is real, an automatic consequence of Europe's unity and peace. The second benefit is contingent upon Europe's willingness to take advantage of its new situation to act beyond its borders more assertively than now. Will the Europeans do so now that their continent is finally becoming peaceful? Will they choose to play a larger role on the world stage that is commensurate with their newly emerging flexibility and power?

The answer will depend upon how Europe views its future priorities. Until recently, most European governments recoiled at the idea that they should begin asserting their power and presence outside their continent. This disinterested mentality had its origins in the Cold War. A century ago, several European countries were strong actors abroad, mostly as imperial powers. But during the Cold War, they retreated from this role, often at U.S. encouragement, to focus on their own continent. This dramatic turnabout made sense not only because imperialism had gone out of fashion, but also because the Europeans needed to focus on grave dangers at home. As a result, they grew comfortable with acting only on their continent, and letting the United States cope with problems elsewhere. Although the Cold War's dangers have faded into history, most European governments today seem content to spend their energy on consolidating their continent's peaceful unity, and they do

not want to be diverted from this critical task until it is complete.

The past two years have witnessed initial signs of a change in this attitude, at least in partial ways. The Kosovo war was one prod, as were pressures from the United States and NATO headquarters to start looking outward--at least to Europe's periphery and maybe beyond. The leading proponents of new thinking have been Britain and France, which in modest ways, retained distant involvements and power projection assets even during the Cold War. Other countries are now showing similar signs of life, albeit in less robust ways. Now that Europe has traveled somewhat in this direction, the central issue is whether it will travel further in the coming years. Only time will tell, but as its unity and peacefulness gain strength, Europe presumably will have greater freedom to take this step--if it chooses to do so.

The incentives for the Europeans not to look outward are well-known and amply documented. Why court trouble when you do not have to do so, or when others will handle it for you? In the face of these negative arguments, what reasons might induce the Europeans to consider involving themselves in events outside their continent? One reason is that their own interests and safety will be at stake in a globalizing world. A second reason is that they might judge the United States cannot be relied upon to adequately safeguard their interests if left to act on its own. Either the United States might become overloaded by responsibilities that exceed its assets, or it might rebel at carrying too many burdens owing to insufficient European help. A third reason is that Europe possesses ample economic, manpower, and technological assets to play a larger role on the world stage, and it can afford to spend the necessary resources for this purpose. A fourth reason is that if the Europeans assert themselves in this way, they stand a good chance of achieving their international goals. Together, these reasons of necessity, feasibility, and effectiveness provide the potential basis for a new European strategic doctrine--but only if the Europeans embrace the idea.

One incentive to craft a new European doctrine is economics. Today Europe's strategic stance is a paradox. Its security outlook is local and regional, but its economic outlook is increasingly global. Europe trades with over 100 countries worldwide, annually exports about $600 billion of products outside its region, and pursues a growing portfolio of finances and business investments worldwide. In addition to its heavy economic commerce with the United States and Canada, it trades with Russia and buys natural resources from other Eurasian countries, is dependent upon Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea oil, is developing close economic ties to Asia, has multiple economic involvements in Africa, and is drawing closer to Latin America. At issue is whether a Europe with such growing economic involvements in these regions can afford to be disengaged from their political and strategic affairs, which plausibly could evolve in ways that damage its profits.

A second incentive stems from the security and military dynamics now unfolding outside Europe's borders, which could damage not only Europe's strategic interests but also its physical safety. WMD proliferation is an especially worrisome concern, for it could result in adversaries acquiring the missiles and warheads needed to rain down destruction on Europe from long distances. The Persian Gulf oilfields, upon which Europe directly or indirectly depends for a sizable portion of its oil at affordable prices, remain vulnerable to

assault by adversaries of Europe. The same judgment of vulnerability applies to the sea and air lanes of communication over which Europe's external commerce passes. At critical points, these networks could be blocked by enemies, thereby choking off Europe's supplies. To the extent that Europe is apprehensive about relying upon the United States and other countries to deal with these dangers, it has an incentive to help deal with them itself.

A third incentive is more fundamental. Globalization is transforming the world, making it different from the past, a more single place that is increasingly bonded together in interactive ties and seems smaller as well. Regions that once were distant from each other are becoming more interdependent, drawing closer together in time and space. Developments in one domain can now have contagious properties, not only quickly spreading around the world, but also affecting other domains in powerful ways. Events in the economic arena can affect the security arena, and vice versa--not only at the point of origin, but also far away. Great changes are at work in the fundamentals of international life, and their pace is quickening. The future is far too foggy to predict, but it has variable properties, and it seems capable of producing sudden shifts and big surprises, for good or ill. Progress can have spinoffs and cascading effects, but so can dangers.

Owing to these developments, the idea that Europe can insulate itself from the world, basking in its own tranquility and disinterested in broader events, is part of a bygone era. Globalization means that directly or indirectly, Europe will be greatly affected by events outside its borders, including those on the other side of the world. Moreover, globalization is hydra-headed, producing good and bad trends, thereby making the future something that must be shaped and guarded against, not taken for granted. Ironically, Europe is achieving its age-old dream of peacefully unifying at a time when it can no longer live alone, by itself, oblivious to the world around it.

For Europeans, the good news is that their growing unity magnifies both their political capacity to work closely together abroad and their physical capacity to mobilize the necessary assets needed to pursue their goals. If they marshal their willpower and consensus to act, a decade or two from now, a united Europe may emerge as a far stronger and more active player on the world scene. This, at least, seems the logic of the emerging strategic situation facing them. In the long term, their growing power, interests abroad, and capacity to contribute seem destined to cast them into the role of accepting considerably greater responsibilities for influencing how the world as a whole evolves. In the near term, their activities likely will be more modest, increasing slowly as their resources and mentality permit. But even in this period, Europe can make worthwhile contributions by acting more assertively than now in four policy arenas: economics, politics, security, and defense.

In the economic arena, Europe faces the challenge of ensuring that its approach to regionalism does not damage the pursuit of global progress. As Robert Gilpin has said, regionalism can be a stepping stone or a roadblock to this goal.[xvi] Managing the world economy will require rules and regulations governing the further lowering of trade barriers, control of financial flows, and the handling of capital, foreign direct investments, multinational corporations, reform practices, and other matters. Owing to its size and far-flung economic involvements, Europe is capable of drawing other regions into a web of growing cooperation, or propelling a drift to competing regional economic blocs. Europe's

actions in the WTO, the G-8, the IMF, and in bilateral dealings with the United States and other countries can exert a powerful influence on how the future unfolds in this critical arena. Likewise, European economic aid can help the developing world overcome its poverty and adjust to globalization's pressures.

In the political arena, Europe will have ample opportunities to help shape the international terrain, to promote multilateral cooperation in several regions, to dampen competitive dynamics, and to deter trouble-makers from aggressive conduct. Its capacity to work closely with the United States and other friendly countries will be critical to applying its influence for constructive purposes. Likewise, Europe's helpful participation in arms control negotiations and related efforts to stem WMD proliferation will be key, especially across the Greater Middle East and nearby regions. Its own efforts to prevent the sale or transfer of destabilizing weapons and technologies can make further contributions to world peace.

In the security arena, greater European cooperation and burden-sharing is badly needed by the United States. Increased activities by Europe likely will flow gradually outward from its borders, into the Euro-Atlantic area and nearby regions first, and to distant regions later. Europe especially is aptly situated to help handle security challenges in the Balkans, the Mediterranean region, the Caucasus, plus parts of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. In these places, it will be able to make major contributions to performing new security and military missions in peace, crisis, and war, thereby taking pressure off overextended U.S. forces. In defending common interests in the Persian Gulf, countries with good power projection assets (e.g., Britain) seem likely to be able and willing to commit more resources than others. The idea of a major European security contribution in Asia and the Pacific seems a theater too far for the coming era.

In the defense arena, the Europeans can take constructive action by answering NATO's call for better forces for new missions, including creation of better assets for power projection and decisive strike operations with U.S. forces. Pursuing such practical steps as better strategic transport, multinational logistics, C4ISR systems, smart munitions, and self-defense assets can materially upgrade the capabilities of European forces for peacekeeping, major expeditionary operations, and counter-WMD missions. The EU can contribute not only by creating command staffs and forces that can operate under its own flag when NATO declines to perform a mission, but also by taking advantage of its ESDP to pursue defense industrial cooperation, common infrastructure assets, joint weapons programs, and integrated support forces. By investing modestly in such areas, individual countries and the EU can greatly enhance Europe's capacity to contribute to future missions and defense of common interests outside its borders.

Constructive policies in all four arenas would be marked by more ambitious goals than now, more resources, and more sustained attention by Europe as a whole. One effect would be to give Europe a larger role on the world stage, but another effect would be to enhance the odds of achieving stability and progress in endangered regions outside Europe. By acting in these ways, the Europeans could help nudge the world economy toward steadier growth and the international political system toward greater order. They could also help dampen security tensions and provide stronger defense resources for dealing with crises and wars. The world would emerge better off, but Europe would too. It would be left

better able to pursue its own unity free from worry that its progress might be rendered moot by descent in the world around it.

Conclusion

What does this vision of Europe's future mean for U.S.-European relations? While the idea of a peaceful Europe has obvious appeal, the parallel idea of a united Europe playing an assertive role on the world stage implies, to some observers, a future of tension in transatlantic relations. Presumably the two sides will be so unable to cooperate that they will frustrate each others' designs in ways causing them to drift apart. But the greater risk to damaged relations is an inward-looking Europe that remains narrowly preoccupied with its own continent and a United States that is left overextended, coping alone with the world's dangers. In this event, they will not see eye-to-eye, and indeed, they will have little in common because the United States will not be concerned about Europe, and Europe will be indifferent to the world. The best hope for the future is a global partnership between them, acting as leaders of the democratic community--not only to preserve healthy relations between them, but also to enhance their capacity to shape the future of a globalizing world.

If such a partnership is to emerge, care will have to be taken in managing future U.S.-European relations in the coming years. Their economic frictions--e.g., disputes over beef, bananas, aircraft consortia, and currency domination--need to be handled in ways that prevent serious damage to their larger political relations. The United States and Europe will be hard-pressed to act as strategic partners if they become rival economic blocs, struggling over each dollar or Euro of profit in a booming world economy that is making both rich. They also will need to coordinate their diplomacies in such contentious places as the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Harmony may seem impossible in today's setting, but if Europe begins accepting more responsibility there and the United States takes advantage of its support, they may find themselves drawing closer together in strategic goals and policies. [xvii] They also will need to develop a better capacity for combined military operations outside Europe. This means that Europe will need to improve its forces for new missions, and the United States will need to work with them and share command authorities. None of these steps will be easy, but they are the stuff of the future. If they can be handled effectively, in the ways of the past, both the United States and Europe will gain, and they can look toward the future with optimism.

Clearly, the United States and Europe will need to reach a healthy accord on how NATO and the EU's ESDP are to relate to each other. While the current dialogue on consultative procedures and rules for using each other's military assets is necessary, agreement on the political basics is even more important. As in the past, future arrangements will endure only if they advance the core, legitimate interests of both the United States and Europe. NATO will need to remain the lead actor when vital U.S. interests are engaged and major U.S. military commitments are made. For cases where Europe's interests are at stake, its forces carry the bulk of the load, and there is no compelling need to use NATO, the EU can be the lead actor. A good rule is that each institution should have authority and influence in ways that reflect its willingness and ability to carry out responsibility. Within this framework, steps can be taken sensibly to allocate strategic roles

and missions among NATO and the EU. If the two bodies are given strategic tasks for which they are well-suited, and the full spectrum of future security challenges is handled effectively, both the United States and Europe likely will come away feeling satisfied. In this event, NATO and the EU can emerge as partners in security and defense, not competitors.

Above all, dealing with the future requires a sense of perspective about the new strategic fundamentals taking shape. Europe's nations stand on the threshold of unity and peace because they learned the art of multilateral cooperation--with each other and the United States--during the Cold War. In order to capitalize on this promise, they will need to master two challenges: achieving deeper EU political integration and enlarging the EU and NATO eastward. They also will need to deal with three troubles: relations with Russia, Balkan affairs, and Turkey. As they grapple with these issues inside Europe, they will face mounting pressures to become more involved in events outside their borders on the world stage. This is a difficult agenda, but Europe, working with the United States, seems likely to handle it well enough to make the next phase of its transition a success. If this proves to be the case, a decade from now Europe will be more unified, more peaceful, and better able to contribute to an orderly world than now.

The future is uncertain, and setbacks may occur. But as of now, the dominating trend is clear. In contrast to its dark history, Europe apparently is becoming a continent that works, that succeeds in crafting a good life for itself. The ability to apply multilateral, transatlantic cooperation to the kinds of complex issues now on its doorstep seems to be its key for further opening the door to a bright future. In the past, issues such as these tore Europe apart, consigning it to conflict and war. Because that is no longer the case, the globalizing world will benefit as a whole. Whether Europe's progress provides a model for other regions to follow is for them to determine. But if they decide to investigate this idea, they likely will emerge no worse for the wear, and perhaps a good deal better off in the bargain.

CHAPTER II

ENHANCING EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTIONS

TO NEW DEFENSE MISSIONS

Recent years have witnessed growing support for the idea that the Europeans should build better military forces for performing new missions outside NATO's borders, in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. The United States has endorsed this goal, as has the NATO alliance, and most European capitals now express at least rhetorical agreement with it. Whereas the United States needs greater help from European partners and NATO in handling these missions, the Europeans have a growing incentive to act because their own interests are at stake. They already think and act globally in economic terms, where they participate in the world economy at far-flung places. Even as they pursue Europe's unity, their security policies face pressures to become more outward-looking as well, in order to help safeguard their economic interests, and to ward off such security threats as spreading violence in the Balkans, WMD proliferation, and loss of access to Persian Gulf oil. This chapter addresses an important and controversial issue: How can the Americans and Europeans join together, using NATO and the EU in tandem, to pursue the defense and military component of this strategic agenda? It tries to shed analytical light on a subject prone to a great deal of heat. [xviii]

The analysis begins by discussing the coming defense agenda in Europe in broad terms, and then assesses the continuing need for addressing it through transatlantic cooperation. Next, the analysis examines the underlying reasons why European forces are constrained today from performing new missions with U.S. forces. It then addresses the requirements ahead for improving European forces: the size and capabilities of forces needed, and the types of multilateral cooperation that can best field them. Finally, it examines the programmatic steps that can be taken so that sufficient capabilities are built at affordable cost, with the Europeans taking responsibility for themselves and the United States helping them. This analysis thus moves from the general to the concrete, in the process illuminating the policies, plans, and programs that can help enhance European contributions to new defense missions.

The Defense Agenda Ahead

If the future military requirements are to be met, the coming defense agenda mandates that the Europeans and NATO focus on creating three new types of military capabilities: special assets for peace operations, improved expeditionary forces for waging major conflicts through swift power projection and decisive operations, and counter-WMD strike assets. The Europeans do not possess these assets in adequate strength today. They will need to possess them tomorrow if NATO is to remain effective, the transatlantic bond is to remain intact, their interests are to be protected, and their safety is to be preserved. Building these assets is a military challenge. But it also is a political challenge too. Both challenges will need to be mastered. The ingredients for mastering them already exist. They merely must be acted upon in prudent but farsighted ways.[xix]

Two or three years ago, many European governments, aside from Britain and France, would have balked at the notion of regularly looking beyond their borders in security affairs. Most still recoil at the thought of global security horizons, especially in faraway Asia. But owing to Kosovo and the earlier Persian Gulf war, a growing number now are starting to accept that they must look outward at least in limited ways: certainly to Europe's periphery and perhaps beyond as well. Building better military forces for new missions in these regions is a natural part of this emerging strategic agenda. While security policy is carried out through multiple instruments, military power is needed to help shape the peacetime strategic environment and to deal with crises that periodically occur. The United States has long accepted this proposition, and in varying ways, the Europeans are now beginning to accept it as well.

To date, the new European consensus is partial, shaky, and uncertain. Today the Europeans are mostly focused on how to nurture their political unification within the European Union (EU). Defense preparedness is secondary, but still, a matter of importance. While Britain, France, and a few others are forthcoming, Germany's success at overcoming its wavering attitude will be key to whether progress can be made. For good or ill, many smaller European countries will either follow its lead or hide behind its skirts. As a whole, the Europeans seemingly agree that better forces are needed, but they have not yet decided upon what kind of forces should be built and how they should be used. Creating better forces for peace operations is one thing. Creating them for fighting serious wars is something else. The pace of improvements is also a critical issue not yet agreed upon. Moving at a snail's pace is different from moving robustly. Even so, the recent positive signs of a new mentality are indisputable. The Europeans have agreed to support NATO's new strategic concept and its DCI program. In pursuing the EU's vision of an ESDP, their accord at Helsinki agreed to create common military capabilities of the sort mandated by Petersberg tasks, new NATO missions and the DCI. If the past is prologue, steps like these are normally signs of further action to come: perhaps not big enough and fast enough to please everybody, but eventually enough to make a critical strategic difference.

The mere act of favoring the goal of better European military capabilities, however, does not mean that this vision will be successfully accomplished. The key question arises: Taking into account the opportunities and constraints, how can this goal best be pursued so that it is actually attained, perhaps not overnight, but gradually over a period of 5-10 years? How should this process be approached in political and military terms? How can NATO and the EU act? What can be reasonably expected of the final result?

In answering these questions, the thesis advanced here is that the goal of better, and fully adequate, European forces for new missions is not a pipe dream. It is not only critical, but also achievable and affordable. It will not be attained easily or without some painful changes. But it can be gradually attained if further, sensible steps are taken to muster the necessary political willpower, to craft a sound programmatic agenda, and to pursue innovative departures. NATO and the EU will need to work together, not apart or as rivals. The Europeans will need to recognize the superpower leadership role of the United States and NATO's role as Europe's premier security organization. The United States will need to recognize the EU's growing importance as an expression of Europe's identity and as an influential role-player in security affairs. The challenges of the future, inside and outside

Europe, are big enough to allow ample room for both NATO and the EU to function effectively. Indeed, handling these challenges mandates that NATO and the EU work as complementary partners.

Adequate funds are a bellwether for European military gains, but identifying the right kinds of concrete measures is critical too, and this will mandate the setting of stiff, well-focused priorities. The Europeans will need not only to improve their forces nationally, but also to integrate them multinationally: an area where the EU can play a constructive role. The United States will need to grow comfortable with the idea of European countries that act together not only politically but also militarily. Whether these difficult hurdles can be overcome is to be seen. What can be said is that NATO's future hangs in the balance, and Europe's safety does too. If better European forces are not built, NATO likely will wither as an effective alliance. It will deteriorate into a fading coalition that can defend Cold War borders that are no longer threatened, but cannot meet new-era challenges to common interests outside these borders. At best, it will be a bifurcated alliance divided between the minority countries that perform new missions and the majority that do not. If better European forces are built, and can work closely with modern U.S. forces, NATO can remain a vibrant part of the democratic community's capacity to deal with a main challenge of the early 21st century: dealing with chaos in outlying regions.

The Need for Continuing U.S.-European Partnership in Security and Defense Affairs

The transatlantic debate taking place today over security relationships is reminiscent of the even angrier debate that erupted during the 1960's over NATO's defense strategy for waging the Cold War. On the surface, that debate focused on strategy concepts, but underneath, it initially pitted American and European interests against each other. After five years of painful struggle, the debate was finally settled when a strategy formula was found that harmonized those interests to the satisfaction of both sides. The strategy of forward defense and flexible response may not have been perfect, but it was good enough for the times. By permitting both the Americans and Europeans to conclude that their interests were adequately safeguarded, it enabled them to get on with the business of restructuring their military forces to carry out a common design. From that decision, taken in 1967, flowed two decades of growing transatlantic defense cooperation that steadily enhanced NATO's effectiveness and Europe's safety as the Cold War moved from mounting danger to a favorable end.

Something similar is needed again. A coherent bargain that upgrades the common interest and permits a return to healthy transatlantic defense cooperation is required. The current debate is being waged over NATO-EU institutional relationships, but at bottom, it is a debate about American and European interests. The Europeans want to unify within the EU and to assert greater control over their destiny. Desiring to be fully sovereign, they no longer want the United States to play the role of paternal father in Europe. The United States wants to ensure that Europe's growing unity does not come at the expense of NATO's effectiveness or its own legitimate influence, or produce a Europe that is an inward-looking free rider. Fearing for their own interests, each side is wary of the other's underlying intent. Neither side is blind to the other's legitimate needs, but too often, the result has been a heated dialogue among the deaf.

Notwithstanding the intense words flowing across the Atlantic in both directions, the elements of a constructive solution already exist, if they can be recognized. The Europeans have reason to preserve a healthy NATO and a strong U.S. leadership role in helping guide mutual defense affairs. The United States stands to profit from a unifying Europe that can take greater responsibility for its military preparedness and for carrying out new defense missions in protecting common interests. A good way to find common ground is to transcend the debate about institutional authority by defining the kinds of defense cooperation that both sides will need and want in the coming years. From this can flow a new transatlantic bargain on defense strategy, the military capabilities that flow from it, and the complementary roles to be played by NATO and the EU.

Thinking about a new transatlantic bargain can best begin by being aware of how the old bargain worked during the Cold War. This bargain was more than abstractly political. Indeed, it was highly military, penetrating to the depths of NATO's forces and operations across the entire integrated command. In each subregion, NATO's military commanders forged operational strategy and plans for defending against attack. The resulting force requirements were then met by NATO nations willing and able to make contributions. Often, the United States made sizable commitments, but for land and air missions, normally no more than 25% of total forces. The remaining forces were provided by the Europeans, primarily by countries located nearby. Command slots were assigned on the basis of national force contributions: acceptance of battlefield responsibility translated into commensurate authority. The result was a coherent relationship between strategy and forces, one that not only defended the relevant borders, but did so in a matter that advanced the core interests of the participating nations.

The basics of defense strategy and forces in the coming era must be addressed in similar terms. The idea of building better European military capabilities rests on the premise that U.S. forces alone cannot be expected to perform the new missions of swift power projection and decisive operations ahead. Why is this the case? After all, the United States is the world's sole superpower. Its forces are far stronger than those of any other country. For them, operating with allied forces is often difficult, not only for political reasons but also for concrete military reasons. Why not rely upon the United States to perform new missions unilaterally, or with a few select partners contributing only at the margins? Why try to change NATO, which is good at border defense in Europe but, thus far, has not been designed to act outside its borders on Europe's periphery and beyond? Why go through the bother and the risk?

The reasons are twofold. First, fair burden-sharing requires that the Europeans make a serious contribution to defending common security interests. U.S. forces cannot be expected to continue performing demanding peacetime missions and crisis involvements, plus face the risks of dangerous combat in major wars, without sizable European allies by their side. The Persian Gulf war was fought with western forces that were 85% American and only 15% European. The Kosovo conflict was waged by NATO, within range of European bases, but its air campaign was carried out by U.S. forces that flew fully two-thirds or more of the missions. Afterward the Europeans agreed to provide the bulk of NATO peacekeepers sent into Kosovo. But the emerging pattern of American forces waging the wars, and European forces keeping the peace afterward, cannot become a model for the

future. Eventually the United States will tire of allies that come across as free-riders when serious dangers must be faced, and the Europeans will slide into the background of serious involvement in common security affairs. This is a prescription for destroying the transatlantic bond, not preserving it.

Second, and equally important, the United States simply lacks the forces needed to shore up the global security system if it is compelled to act mostly alone. True, U.S. forces are the world's strongest. But this is the case because of their high quality, not their preponderant quantity. In size, they account for only about 7% of the military forces under arms worldwide. Moreover, they cannot be everywhere at once. Their global missions result in them being scattered among multiple different theaters in peace, crisis, and war. They are critical to each region's stability, but not because of their size. Although they can be concentrated in a crisis, competing needs place limits on how many can be assembled in one place. In today's setting, U.S. forces assigned to NATO and Europe also have missions in other theaters in event of war there. Even when other theaters are peaceful, the U.S. military command in Europe can confidently rely only on about 350,000-400,000 troops from all services to perform NATO missions: 100,000 troops actually stationed in Europe (120,000 counting rotational naval units) and another 250,000 or more troops from the continental United States that can be drawn upon as reinforcements in a crisis--provided they are not committed elsewhere. Even when fully reinforced, U.S. forces amount only to about 10% of the military manpower in and around Europe. In size, they are roughly equal to the forces of Germany or France. While they can perform individual missions whose requirements do not exceed their capacity, they cannot perform bigger missions (such as a major theater war), and they cannot perform multiple demanding missions at the same time. For military reasons alone, sizable European force contributions are needed to fill the gap.

The illusion of preponderant U.S. military strength derives partly from the big U.S. defense budget of about $280 billion, which is far larger than any single country in Europe or elsewhere. But the geostrategic situation dictates an abnormally big defense budget for a relatively small posture of only 1.4 million active-duty troops. The United States has a demanding global strategy and involvements that mandate a wide diversity of capabilities. Because most countries focus only on their borders or local regions, they are able to deploy a limited set of assets, which keeps costs down. For example, Germany needs a big army and air force, but not a blue-water navy or a nuclear posture. Its ability to focus and specialize has a dampening effect on its defense budget, allowing it to get by with less spending. By contrast, the United States must maintain many different types of forces: still-sizable nuclear forces, large mobility forces, strong ground and air forces for continental operations, powerful carrier and marine amphibious forces for maritime missions, advanced C4ISR systems, big overseas bases and facilities, a large R&D effort, and a diverse domestic infrastructure able to support swift power projection abroad. Each of these components must be highly capable in itself, while all of them must be able to work closely together. This posture yields a requirement for many different types of weapons, equipment items, training regimens, and operational practices. Nearly all of them are expensive in ways that propel the DoD budget upward.

The other reason for a big U.S. defense budget is the high emphasis on quality.

Precisely because U.S. forces are not overpoweringly large, they must rely on superior quality to defeat their enemies, who often possess numerical superiority, in a wide variety of locations and terrain conditions. Contributing importantly to high quality is the U.S. practice of relying upon a professional and all-volunteer force, which produces skilled servicemen but is expensive. Most active-duty U.S. combat forces are kept at full manning and high readiness so they can deploy quickly and fight immediately. They also train a great deal, considerably more than many other militaries, which permits them to carry out modern doctrines that are key to high combat effectiveness. Their technologies, especially their weapons and munitions, are the most sophisticated in the world. They also are provided large and multifaceted logistic support assets that give them firepower, tactical mobility, and endurance. The combination of readiness, modernization, and sustainment has a synergistic effect in producing the highest quality forces anywhere. But it comes at the price of big defense budgets, and it produces forces that are only moderately large in total quantity, and are scattered among multiple different components.

The bottom line is that owing to their far-flung global roles, U.S. forces are already overstretched. As WMD proliferation accelerates and other endangering trends gain momentum in a globalizing world where power remains important, they likely will become stretched even thinner than now. Overstretched U.S. forces will be hard-pressed to defend American interests unless they are given help by allies and friends. If they cannot protect American interests, they will not be able to protect Europe's extended interests either. This especially could become true in distant areas, but if events are not handled properly, U.S. forces might not even be able to defend Europe's interests on the continent of Europe and its periphery if they are not supported by allies performing new missions. As an illustration, what would have happened if the Kosovo conflict had erupted at a time when U.S. forces were waging a major regional war elsewhere? In all likelihood, the U.S. military contribution would have been considerably smaller, especially in such critical assets as C4ISR, electronic warfare, defense suppression, stealth aircraft, and cruise missiles. NATO might have been hard-pressed to conduct a major air campaign at all. U.S. planning can help reduce the risk of future shortfalls in Europe, but in the final analysis, sufficient European forces must be available to perform added duties in the event that U.S. forces are diverted elsewhere.

Even in an era when the Europeans are striving to establish a stronger self-identity, the United States continues to make immense contributions to their security. Its strong support for NATO and EU enlargement is a powerful indicator that it favors Europe's unity. The United States continues to provide nuclear deterrence coverage over its NATO allies, and it serves as a laboratory for developing ballistic missile defense technologies, should deployment of them prove necessary. U.S. conventional defense contributions to Europe's security are also larger than is commonly realized. But the United States cannot be viewed as a military horn-of-plenty by Europeans. The current U.S. posture stationed in Europe provides only two divisions (four combat brigades), 2.3 USAF fighter wings, and most of the time, a Navy CVBG and ARG (with a Marine battalion) operating in the Mediterranean. When reinforced to a level of 350,000 troops or more, U.S. combat forces likely would total up to 5-6 Army and Marine divisions, 8-9 fighter wings, and 2-3 CVBGs, backed up by mobility forces, C4ISR systems, theater-wide support units and reception facilities, and other assets. By any measure, this is a powerful military commitment that fully meets U.S.

responsibilities to NATO and Europe. But it is not a force posture for all seasons, or a stand-alone capability. What it provides is a core of joint, high-technology forces around which an effective NATO-wide coalition can be built. But if U.S. forces are to perform their leadership roles, the rest of this coalition must be present, in adequate numbers and sufficient quality. If European forces are not present in the necessary ways, NATO will not be able to perform its new missions irrespective of the U.S. contribution.

Today the Europeans are not capable of contributing in the necessary ways. Their total capability for power projection in a demanding wartime contingency, short of a months-long exercise in mobilization and creation of new assets, is only about 75,000 troops: roughly two division-equivalents, 3-4 air wings, and 20-30 naval combatants. Even these forces--only 20% as large as the U.S. contribution--cannot deploy as swiftly as their U.S. counterparts. This small posture, mostly composed of British and French units, is only about 3% of total European active-duty forces. Excluding new members, European forces currently total about 2.3 million troops, 58 mobilizable division-equivalents, 3500 tactical combat aircraft, and 317 naval combatants. In the coming years, these numbers likely will be reduced by about 15%, but Europe's forces still will remain large. The forces of the northern and central regions are the best-trained and equipped, but only about 7% of these forces can be readily projected outside their borders.

European Forces in NATO[xx]

	Active Manpower	Division-Equivalents	Combat Aircraft	Naval Combatants
Northern & Central Regions	1,075,600	26	2057	183
Southern Region	1,193,400	32	1495	134
New Members	342,300	13	472	5
Total	2,611,300	71	4024	322

The current U.S. overseas military presence in Europe of 100,000 troops seems unlikely to remain at present levels unless the Europeans build better forces for new missions. The current imbalance, in which U.S. forces contribute fully 350,000 troops or more for power projection, but the Europeans add only about 75,000 troops that cannot deploy swiftly, is too lopsided to endure. U.S. forces are no longer needed in Europe in order to defend NATO's borders against surprise attack. Missions in other regions are a beckoning call for them to be deployed elsewhere. The United States will always need command structures, bases, reception facilities, and transit arrangements in Europe. But these needs can be met with about 25,000 troops.[xxi] The principal argument for retaining

large U.S. combat forces in Europe is to maintain robust partnership relations with allies and friends so that combined, multinational operations can be launched in crises and wars. If such partners are not available, why keep U.S. combat forces there, when they could be better-used elsewhere? Simply stated, the current situation of European deficiencies is a sure-fire recipe for eventual U.S. military withdrawal. In order to keep U.S. forces there, where they can continue to provide the leadership core for coalition defense practices and a still-vibrant NATO, a better European contribution is needed.

In judging how the future should be shaped, a sense of perspective about the strategic basics is needed. Only a few years ago, the idea of Europe remaining a theater of serious military preparations seemed like a Cold War anachronism. Even U.S. defense planning seemed to accept the idea that confrontations and wars in Europe were a thing of the past. NATO's European members resolved to preserve downsized yet still-sizable military establishments. But viewing their forces mostly as a hedge against old threats that were unlikely to return, they did not invest considerable political energy or budget resources in maintaining their preparedness, much less configure them for new missions. Kosovo has shattered the illusion of a permanently peaceful Europe. It shows that although old Cold War threats are gone, the continent remains vulnerable to new dangers, including ethnic hatreds and raw-boned nationalism. Outside Europe, festering political conflicts and WMD proliferation in the Greater Middle East and elsewhere illuminate the growing extent to which new dangers to common interests are bubbling. These troubling events show that although the new Europe is unifying, it is not yet permanently peaceful, and it cannot be walled off from the rest of the world. As a result, European and NATO military power will remain an important part of the new strategic equation on the continent and elsewhere. The challenge is to ensure that its contribution will be a source of greater strength, not a deficiency or a liability.

Greater European military strength is needed so that NATO can perform the full spectrum of new missions: not just peace operations, but various types of warfighting, ranging from small crisis interventions, to major battlefield campaigns, to counter-WMD strike operations. In many cases, the Europeans may be called upon to contribute a greater share of forces than customary in the past. Enhanced European military power is needed for other purposes as well. Some years ago, the Belgian foreign minister portrayed the EU as an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm. The EU is now acquiring greater political stature, but it will not gain true military stature unless the Europeans actually create forces that can perform the demanding and important missions of the future. If European forces cannot act effectively within NATO, with U.S. help, they will not be able to perform effectively outside NATO either, even if they are flying the EU's flag. An additional purpose is to enhance the capacity of European countries to play contributing roles when informal coalitions are formed to deal with situations outside Europe. The Persian Gulf war was fought by one such U.S.-led coalition. Neither NATO or the EU formally deployed forces, but several European countries did so, especially Britain and France. These countries were able to participate then because the political situation gave them six months to deploy their forces. Similar coalitions may be created in the future, and next time, the situation might not be so accommodating.

In handling the new challenge, both the United States and Europe need to be guided

by a far-sighted sense of vision that instructs them on how to continue working closely together. In the past century, the United States fought two world wars in Europe, and then waged the Cold War for forty long years. Today, Europe's unification offers the enticing prospect of a long-troubled continent being rendered peaceful in ways that will allow the United States to focus on other endangered regions without always looking over its shoulder, worried about Europe going up in flames. Moreover, a stronger and unified Europe will be better able to provide the United States with reliable and effective partners both on the continent and elsewhere. For Europe, unification is a critical strategic goal that will receive top priority. But Europeans cannot afford to pursue it in ways that leave the transatlantic partnership shattered, along with their continent's interests and safety exposed to dangers arising elsewhere. The two sides of the Atlantic thus have a shared agenda in ensuring that both Europe's unification and NATO's military reform are accomplished at a proper pace and in the right ways. The United States will need European partners and NATO to help deal with future challenges and dangers. The Europeans will need to help protect their own interests, and to preserve their security partnership with the United States. In ways different from the Cold War, the two sides of the Atlantic will continue needing each other's help and support. The looming issue is whether they will be able to master the new forms of defense cooperation required to get the job done in a manner satisfying to both of them.

Where do these strategic realities leave NATO and the EU? Clearly both institutions need to work together, not apart or at odds with each other. They need to understand how their respective roles can be made complementary. NATO is good at providing strategic guidance on how forces should be designed, at integrating them operationally, and at actually using them during crises in concert with the United States. But it lacks the authority and talent to build the forces themselves. Many Europeans hope that the EU can become an institution for employing forces in crises, especially in situations where the United States and NATO do not step up to the plate. But while these situations may occur, they likely will be few and far between, and they will deal with minor matters, not major events. Having the EU develop into an additional asset for employing forces may make strategic sense, but the EU's greater potential lies in performing what NATO cannot do: helping build integrated European forces with effective capabilities for the new era. In this arena, the EU has the potential to contribute a great deal by fostering common approaches to training, doctrines, structures, operations, transport, logistics, weapons, technology, information systems, industry, and infrastructure. If a new transatlantic bargain can be fashioned whereby NATO is the primary (but not sole) consumer of forces, and the EU becomes an increasingly potent producer of forces, both sides of the Atlantic stand to benefit. In any event, a fair exchange is that the United States should support a constructive ESDP by the EU, and in return, the Europeans should pursue the DCI in robust ways. The United States will need to fulfill its end of the bargain, but the Europeans will need to fulfill their end too.

How will future military operations actually be carried out in an era when NATO and the EU both have a capability to act? In most cases, NATO will remain the instrument of choice. One reason is that U.S. forces will often be committed in sufficient numbers to necessitate the use of NATO's integrated command, where the United States is represented. An additional reason is that NATO will provide, for many years, the best command option to the Europeans. The popular notion that NATO's integrated command is U.S.-dominated falls

apart when the details are examined. Yes, SACEUR is an American: at long-standing European insistence. But Europeans have always occupied important positions throughout the integrated command, where they have had a major influence over strategy, forces, and defense plans. The Deputy SACEUR is European. During the Cold War, a German general commanded AFCENT, and a British Admiral, AFNORTH. Virtually all U.S. forces assigned to NATO operated under the direct leadership of European officers. The same remains true today in the revised command structure. Throughout its sub-components, NATO's current structure can be adjusted to reflect changing European preferences for roles, forces, and operational concepts. NATO also is capable of creating Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF's) for situations where regional or functional commands are not directly used, or providing forces that can be detached and employed as informal coalitions. These assets give Europe powerful reasons to employ NATO most of the time.

Some cases may arise in which the Europeans decide to employ the EU and its forces, rather than NATO. For the coming period, this preference likely will arise only in peace operations and small crisis interventions. The willingness of the Europeans to do so likely will depend upon their confidence in the EU's operational capabilities for planning and executing such missions. But even when the EU acts independently, NATO likely will enter the equation in background ways. Often the Europeans will need to draw upon NATO for such specialized support as C4ISR, transport, and logistics. Sometimes, they may need to remove combat and support forces from assignment to NATO's integrated command. Even when this is not the case, virtually any significant EU operation will compel NATO to make adjustments in its forces, operations, and procedures in order to remain fully prepared for concurrent contingencies that could trigger NATO action. For these practical reasons, NATO and the EU inevitably will need to remain closely tied together, rather than operate as separate bodies. The manner in which NATO and the EU work together will vary from one situation to the next. The enduring constant is that for either or both of them to be effective, European forces must be fully capable of performing their missions. The need for adequate European military capabilities is what should drive future planning, not debates over the respective authorities of NATO and the EU.

More fundamental, the issue is not the relationship between NATO and the EU, but instead, the division of military responsibilities between the United States and Europe. What is to be the cooperative model for new missions that allocates transatlantic burdens fairly, protects vital national interests of participants, and attains common security goals? As said earlier, the existing model of the United States providing 80% of the assets for power projection and related new missions, and the Europeans only 20%, cannot endure. Nor can a model in which European force contributions might be larger, but the United States fights the serious wars and the Europeans perform peace operations. Nor do other simple-minded, generic models stand the test of scrutiny. One example is a model in which the United States provides high-technology forces, especially from the air and sea, while the Europeans provide low-tech ground forces that lack the necessary capabilities for modern doctrine. A similar judgment applies to a rigid model in which different geographic responsibilities are assigned to the United States and Europe, or to a model in which the two sides always commit a fixed percentage of forces to each operation. As argued below, the two sides should provide similar forces to new missions in the aggregate, but a 50% rule for each side should not rule in each event because often it would not make political and military sense.

In some cases, the United States may need to contribute more than 50%, and in other cases, the Europeans more.

How about a universal model in which all nineteen NATO members make serious force contributions to each new mission? In theory, this model sounds attractive because it mobilizes all of NATO for each mission and reinforces the principle that security is indivisible. It might result in a regular practice in which the United States commits one-third of the forces for each mission, and the Europeans, two-thirds: the ratio of military manpower on both sides. But would this ratio make any more sense than a 50-50 ratio in each case? Even though a universal model must be used to make top-level judgments about strategic decisions, it breaks down in other ways when applied to the details of military operations. What formula is to be used to determine force contributions for all nineteen members? Are all members to contribute equally or in disproportionate shares that reflect their different capabilities for the task at hand? How is an effective defense posture in each case to be created if force contributions reflect such political guidelines, not military requirements? Would a deployed posture drawing forces from nineteen countries, each in small or moderate amounts, be able to function effectively? How is political authority for using forces to be shared if some countries are more committed to the operation's goals than others? For these reasons, NATO's practice for many years has been to approach force operations in more focused ways, guided by practicality and by the paramount need for political coherence and military effectiveness.

The tradeoffs of alternative approaches need to be weighed carefully before decisions are made. But all things considered, the new-mission model that seemingly makes best sense is the flexible and responsive one that NATO has been using for its border defense operations since its inception. This is the "capable coalition" model, i.e., responsibility and authority for carrying out each mission is assigned to a sub-coalition of the willing and able, who are expected to act for NATO's best interests as a whole. During the Cold War, NATO always acted as a universal coalition in political and strategic terms, but its individual regional defense plans seldom involved all its members, especially in a formalistic way. Instead, each plan was entrusted to a sub-coalition of members that were politically eager to carry out NATO's strategy in that zone, and were capable of acting together to provide the necessary forces. Overall, fair burden-sharing and effective defense were emphasized, but the national mix of force contributions varied greatly from one region or functional area to the next. NATO's Center Region, for example, was defended by nine countries that together fielded 45 divisions and 3600 combat aircraft: enough to get the job done. The same applied to the Northern and Southern regions, where different sub-coalitions took shape, and to maritime defense.

The advantage of this approach—universality in policy but selectivity in implementation—is that it worked. It seems best able to work again for new missions. Under this model, capable coalitions will be formed to cover the wide spectrum of new missions in their specific geographic regions or functional areas. All coalitions must enjoy broad political support from the United States and Europe, but the exact composition of each coalition will vary from one case to the next. What matters is that all missions receive sufficient forces in order to attain their goals, and that overall, fair-burden sharing is achieved not only between the United States and Europe, but among Europe's countries

themselves. Planning of this sort is the best guarantee of consistent strategic success. It must be done in advance, not carried out in ad-hoc ways or improvised on the spur of the moment. Once it is performed, decisions can be made about the roles to be played by NATO and the EU. NATO should be used whenever U.S. forces contribute heavily or European forces require leadership by the integrated command. The EU can be used when NATO declines to act, the Europeans provide the forces, and the EU is capable of getting the job done. If this institutional division-of-labor is pursued, NATO and the EU will be able to work together in complementary ways, not as competitors or as rivals stumbling over each other, negating each other's efforts. The strategic consequence will be that common security interests are adequately protected across the board. Moreover, both institutions will have a warm place in the sun, performing missions that reflect their capabilities and instincts.

The Sources of Europe's Military Troubles

Regardless of the model used, Europe's capabilities for new missions need considerable improvements. Before the defense agenda ahead can be crystallized, the underlying reasons for Europe's current military deficiencies at new missions need to be understood. Better European forces might be easier to create if the matter simply was one of convincing their governments to adopt a new, outward-looking political and strategic mentality. Forging such a mentality, of course, is essential, and despite recent progress, its full flowering might not come soon. But the problem goes far beyond politics. Europe's forces were originally created to serve different purposes whose origins lie in the Cold War. Before they can perform new missions, they will have to undergo important changes in their physical structures. They also will need to learn how to work alongside U.S. forces that will be carrying out new doctrines borne of the information era. Only a portion of Europe's forces will need to become capable of swift power projection followed by decisive force operations. But transforming them will be difficult, not only because today's political atmosphere is unenthusiastic and sufficient funds are lacking, but also because new structures and doctrines must be crafted. Yet, this transformation is well-within Europe's capacity to handle--especially if the United States helps the effort.

Today, the United States is good at swift power projection and decisive strike operations because it has been practicing this demanding military art for fully 25 years. After the Vietnam War ended, the United States began greatly enlarging its strategic airlift and sealift assets in order to develop a better capacity to deploy forces from its own continent to Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. It also maintained its active forces in high-readiness, well-trained status so that they would be prepared to start moving quickly, within days of receiving orders. The result has been today's "dumbbell" U.S. posture in which active and reserve component forces are largely kept separate from each other, rather than blended together in ways that result in slow mobilization. In addition, the United States has long been preparing its combat forces for modern war-fighting operations, a process that was greatly aided by the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980's. Since then, its land forces have been focusing on corps-level maneuvers, nonlinear combat, and the operational art. Its air forces have been focusing on precision strikes against enemy forces at or near the battlefield, as well as strategic targets deep in the rear areas. Its naval forces, led by big carriers with strike aircraft and combatants with cruise missiles, have been focusing not only on blue-water superiority, but also on contributing to the land and air

battles. Equally important, all service components have been working closer together in order to create joint capabilities in ways allowing them to blend their separate assets into a single whole that can be employed by CINCs to wage integrated campaigns.

Evidence of this progress first became apparent in the Persian Gulf war, a joint operation in which U.S. forces led a large coalition to quick and decisive victory against a heavily armed Iraqi opponent. Since that conflict, U.S. forces have been working hard at further developing and improving their hard-won superiority. Currently they are networking their assets through information systems and grids, experimenting with new structures, buying new smart munitions, and preparing for a major new wave of modernization, starting with a big air procurement effort that will be launched soon. Guided by such concepts as dominant maneuver and precision engagement, air forces are focusing on deep strikes and real-time operations, ground forces are focusing on dispersing their assets while advancing faster and deeper than before, and naval forces are developing better capabilities for joint operations and littoral missions. This overall plan is intended to produce a true "revolution" in military affairs by creating a new military mentality while elevating U.S. force operations onto a higher plateau of capabilities. But it is evolutionary in the sense that even today, U.S. forces already stand on a high plateau, well-above European forces in their capacity to synthesize swift projection and decisive strikes.[xxii]

In important ways, European forces have been taking defense preparedness seriously, but they have been guided by a quite different strategic design than U.S. forces. At the time when the United States began creating large mobility assets for swift projection, it urged its European allies not to become heavily involved in this costly enterprise. Instead, it urged them to focus on local border defense operations in order to upgrade NATO's ability to counter Warsaw Pact force improvements in Central Europe and along the northern and southern flanks. Knowing that the United States and Britain would provide most of NATO's assets for quickly maneuvering forces among their three sub-regions, the Europeans complied with this guidance. Only Britain and France retained a capacity for division-sized projection missions, supported by commensurate air forces and small naval carriers. Other countries retained enough assets only for minor deployments of a single infantry brigade or battalion, backed by small air and naval forces.

The powerful German military focused mostly on local, stationary defense of its own borders. So did the Low Countries in Central Europe, the Norwegians and Danes in the northern region, and the Italians, Greeks, and Turks in the southern region. Most of these countries blended their active and reserve manpower in order to mobilize large formations over a period of weeks and months, rather than smaller forces that could be generated quickly. Because most European armies could draw upon local national infrastructures, they did not acquire the special logistics assets--e.g. construction engineers, mobile maintenance, long-distance supply lines, deployable command staffs, and field hospitals--that are needed by expeditionary forces. Most countries did not acquire blue-water navies, instead preparing their modest naval forces for coastal defense. Nor did German forces and most other European militaries focus on fast ground maneuvers and precision air strikes. Instead, they focused primarily on their forward, mostly stationary responsibilities for border defense, carried out by large ground and air forces that could generate high volumes of local firepower, but could not maneuver quickly or strike precisely against rear-area targets.

Looking back, this division-of-labor between the U.S. and European militaries made sense as an effective way to wage the Cold War. Indeed, it played a key role in upgrading NATO's military stature as that conflict moved to its climactic phase in the late 1980's. Had a war occurred in the early or mid-1970's, the Warsaw Pact might have won. But the military balance began changing when NATO adopted the formula of the Europeans providing large, stationary masses for forward defense and the United States providing mobile reserves that could be concentrated quickly. By the late 1980's, NATO had not only pulled even in the military balance, but was starting to move ahead with vastly improved conventional defenses and theater nuclear missiles. Had a war broken out then, NATO would have acquitted itself well, and might even have defeated the Warsaw Pact decisively. Most likely, NATO's growing self-defense capability played a role in motivating the Soviet Union to throw in the towel, for its expensive 20-year investment in military superiority had come to naught.

The problem facing European militaries today is that they still remain mostly locked into this fading defense concept of local border defense. In doing so, they have not been ignoring the future, but instead faithfully carrying out earlier guidance given to them by NATO. When the Cold War ended in 1990-1991, NATO adopted a new defense concept focused in theory on moving away from stationary defense, toward greater flexibility and mobility. As a practical matter, this mobility was to be provided mostly by U.S. and British forces, not other European countries. NATO's concept called for a downsized multinational posture of reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. This tripartite posture was to be capable of fending off regional attacks against alliance borders, rather than a theater-wide invasion. NATO created a large reaction force of fully nine divisions, nearly 600 combat aircraft, and 150 naval combatants. These reaction forces were to be maintained at high readiness, capable of responding quickly to local emergencies. But being ready to react quickly was not defined in terms of being able to deploy swiftly to far-away places.

Although Britain took the lead by committing two divisions, nearly every European country joined this prestigious endeavor by assigning either a division or a brigade, along with commensurate air and naval forces. Most of these forces, however, remained local and regional in their outlooks. In order to carry out projection missions, NATO was left relying mainly on two combat formations. First, there was its British-led "ACE Rapid Reaction Corps" (ARRC), a four-division posture in which the Britain and the United States would provide up to 75% of the assets. Second, there was a separate U.S. corps-sized posture of ground, air, and naval forces that would be provided mostly by reinforcements sent from the United States in a crisis. Surveying this posture at the time, NATO military authorities concluded that while it was not large, it likely provided them sufficient assets to handle the emergency requirements ahead for swiftly deployable forces.[xxiii]

Today's problem is that this posture is now proving to be too small to handle newly emerging requirements. This is the case partly because U.S. reinforcements of NATO are uncertain, dependent upon favorable conditions in other regions. Equally important, NATO now finds itself regularly carrying out demanding peace operations and related crisis interventions in the Balkans. With its existing headquarters staffs and forces consumed by this demanding mission, NATO has insufficient forces left over for other concurrent

emergencies, especially for situations in which U.S. reinforcements are not fully available. Additional European contributions to new power projection missions are now needed. NATO's new strategic concept, adopted in 1999, lays the foundation for this change. But because most European forces remain locked in the past, saddled with structures that are not altered quickly and easily, they find themselves hard-pressed to meet this demand anytime soon.

The Europeans have ample combat forces at their disposal to meet this demand. The Reaction Force alone has six additional divisions aside from British and U.S. contributions. NATO's main defense forces provide an additional sixteen divisions, along with large air and naval forces.[xxiv] But these forces are mostly not tailored for power projection. They especially lack the necessary strategic mobility, logistics support, and command structures for expeditionary missions. They are manned by a mixture of active and reserve troops that retards their prompt readiness for quick deployments. Their training regimens are reasonably good, but not enough to meet the standards needed to permit quick deployment without further training, which can take weeks. Their weapons are modern, but their doctrine is rapidly falling behind the major changes taking place in U.S. forces, which are pulling ahead in preparing for the information age of warfare.

This situation, a product of history, plays a major role in explaining why European participation in NATO's DCI has gotten off to a slow start. Over one year has passed since the DCI was adopted, but it is too soon to tell whether success will be achieved in an effort that will take a decade or more. In the past, European participation in such NATO-wide endeavors has started slowly, then gained momentum, and finished reasonably strong. In the interim, NATO military commanders were left frustrated at the initial slowness of progress: examples are AD-70 and the LTDP of the 1970's, and the CDI of the 1980's. Today, European militaries are reacting slowly in part because they first must perform a great deal of thinking and planning about how their structures must be changed in order both to project power swiftly and then to conduct decisive strike operations with U.S. forces. Moreover, they lack the flexible funds needed to carry out new endeavors in big ways. European defense spending is nearly $160 billion. In theory this large amount should provide funds for the DCI. But the vast majority of current budgets are needed to support their currently large forces of 2.3 million active-duty troops. Only 20% of these funds are left over for normal procurement, much less new departures in structures, operations, weapons, and munitions. The good news is that European militaries are awakening to the new challenges ahead. The bad news is that they are constrained by circumstances from reacting with alacrity. This mixed situation provides the context for thinking about how the future should be approached.

European Requirements for New Missions: Toward Transatlantic Parity

Despite today's frustrations, this is not a time for giving up on the Europeans. Even though they are reacting slowly, they possess the military skills and basic economic assets needed to create properly improved forces for new missions. What the current situation mandates is a focus on the initial improvements that can be made in the next few years, followed by more changes later. At the same time, Europe's understandable focus on modest, near-term measures cannot be allowed to deteriorate into a lack of strategic vision

about ultimate goals. The United States, the Europeans, and NATO can profitably use the current period of slow progress to create a common sense of ultimate requirements and goals. What is to be the military end-game of NATO's DCI, the EU's ESDP, and related European force improvements? This is a key question to be answered, for it will have a partial effect on near-term measures, and a big impact on mobilizing political consensus for larger steps to be taken in the medium-term and long-term.[xxv]

What strategic requirements should animate European defense preparations over the long haul? While this question can be answered concretely only through a technical analysis, a valid general principle is that the Europeans should be asked to share the defense burdens fairly and to fulfill likely needs in peace, crisis, and war. In order to serve both purposes, this analysis judges that an appropriate strategic concept would be for the Europeans broadly to match the U.S. military contribution to new missions. Since the U.S. contribution is 350,000- 400,000 troops, the European contribution would be in the same ballpark: perhaps somewhat more manpower but less high-technology assets. The Europeans would not replicate the exact U.S. force mix, but they would provide similar forces in overall size and capabilities. Because the U.S. posture is especially strong in air and naval forces, the European posture might be weighted more heavily toward ground forces, but both sides of the Atlantic would make sizable contributions in all three components.

Judged in relation to the current European capability of about 75,000 troops, this concept of transatlantic parity appears, at first glance, quite ambitious and perhaps too-demanding. Closer inspection, however, suggests a more positive appraisal. This goal would require the Europeans to prepare only about 20-25% of their active manpower and mobilizable forces for power projection missions: hardly an outlandish number. Moreover, the Europeans would not have to create entirely new combat forces, but merely upgrade the capabilities of existing forces. Indeed, they could reduce their current postures appreciably and still have ample manpower and weapons to provide the necessary forces. The cost of the DCI, an estimated $100-125 billion over ten years, is only 6-8% of the defense funds already planned to be spent: a readily affordable amount and a cost-effective investment. The DCI itself does not require major new weapons platforms: in this arena, European forces are mostly modern and well-equipped. What the DCI requires is investments in such areas as C4ISR, information-era networks, smart munitions, civilian transports assets that can be mobilized in a crisis, and long-distance logistic support. Fortunately these assets are not highly expensive.

What are the implications for overall European defense spending? Today the Europeans in NATO have an $8 trillion economy, yet spend only 2% or less of their GDP's on defense. What matters is not the share of GDP allocated to defense, but whether defense budgets are adequate to meet military preparedness needs. Currently this does not appear to be the case, but the margin of deficiency is open to interpretation. The defense budgets of northern and central Europe are the best-funded, but even so, their per-capita spending is only about $120,000 per active-duty troop, compared to about $195,000 per troop for the United States. Because the Europeans have different strategic needs, they need not mimic the United States in this arena. Yet their current budgets seem too low to fund a normally healthy military, much less pursue new strategic departures. With United States now increasing its defense spending, the Europeans are coming under constructive pressure to

follow suit.

Clearly the Europeans will need to halt their steady downward drift of defense spending in recent years. This especially is true of Germany, whose annual defense budget has shrunk to less than $30 billion. Across Europe, force reductions of about 15% already have been authorized by NATO military authorities, and even bigger reductions may be possible. What Europe will need is a smaller, but higher-quality force posture, with fewer border defense forces and more forces for power projection and expeditionary missions. Savings from reducing unneeded forces should be devoted to investments in improved quality rather than pocketed in the form of lower budgets. In addition to funding the DCI, the Europeans face the need to increase their annual procurement and R&D spending, which today is only about $40 billion, compared to about $90 billion for the United States. In the coming years, they too will need to modernize their inventories by replacing obsolescent weapons with new models. This effort will not be cheap, but neither must it be hideously expensive because, similar to the United States, the Europeans can safely pursue a gradual modernization rather than a frantic plan.

The main challenge facing Europe is not one of dramatically elevating their defense budgets to a far higher plateau in a short period. Instead, it is one of steadily increasing their spending in slow but sure ways over a period of ten years. For Europe as a whole, an increase of 1-2% in real spending each year would generate an additional $80-160 billion during 2001-2010. This extra amount, coupled with savings of about $80-120 billion owing to force reductions, would create $160-280 billion of flexible investment funds: enough to pursue much of the DCI and other normal improvements. A practice of slow, steady increases can be funded from normal European economic growth, which likely will be 2-4% per year in the coming decade. The bottom line is while the Europeans will need to increase their defense spending, they can readily manage the task without gutting their national economies.

The burden of defense spending increases likely will fall heavily on countries in Europe's northern and central regions. They are NATO's wealthiest members, they already fund the biggest defense budgets (70% of European NATO's total), they are best-able to afford increases, and their forces are the most important to NATO's future posture. Britain and the Netherlands have done best at keeping defense spending high enough to support their forces: they have the smallest increases to fund. France, Denmark, and Norway fall into a middle category, and thus face higher increases. Belgium and lately Germany occupy the lowest rungs of spending in relation to forces being supported, and therefore face the biggest increases. Germany's stance is especially important because its seven active brigades and 490 combat aircraft provide a critical pool of potential forces for new NATO missions. Unless Germany restores a higher level of defense spending, its forces risk steadily losing their readiness, combat power, and capacity for innovation. In this event, all of NATO will suffer. Along the southern region, Italy alone has the wealth and modern forces to make a serious contribution to new NATO missions. Turkey has large forces and an interest in regional security affairs, but its forces suffer major shortfalls in readiness and modernization owing to the country's poverty and small defense budgets. It may need added military assistance in order to play a stronger role. Greece, Spain, and Portugal likely will contribute in symbolic yet useful ways.

In today's setting, progress depends upon the ability of European militaries to use the resources at their disposal gradually to chip away at the defense agenda facing them. Their efforts alone will yield tangible results in the coming years. Prospects for faster progress hinge on whether a stronger political consensus favoring the idea takes hold in the coming years. Provided greater political support can be built, the goal of transatlantic parity is a doable proposition. Its strategic advantages are obvious. Not only would the burdens be shared fairly, but the United States would gain a powerful incentive to retain large forces in Europe: the prospect of equally large partners capable of working closely with them on new missions. NATO would gain nearly a 70% increase in its forces for these missions. Its improved posture of about 800,000 U.S. and European troops for new missions would render it far more capable of dealing with demanding crisis situations in the coming years. As a consequence, the transatlantic bond would be restored, and NATO would become empowered to adapt to new strategic conditions in ways that would make it an effective alliance for the future. Any European contribution far larger than this goal would seem superfluous. Anything far less would not be enough--by a wide margin. Thus, transatlantic parity makes strategic sense for more reasons than one.

Creating Adequate Force Structures for New Missions

The concept of transatlantic parity has valid meaning only if it gives rise to sensible decisions on the numbers and types of European forces that will be needed for new missions. Both NATO and the Europeans seemingly have work to do in this critical arena of force levels, structures, and program priorities. Adequate force structures for new missions cannot be created overnight. But a strategic plan is needed to ensure that they will emerge over the coming decade. With such a plan, initial steps can be taken in the next few years, followed by bigger steps later. In this manner, Europeans can gradually create the types of forces that they and NATO will need for new missions.

The key question to be asked is: What kinds of new capabilities and associated force structures will the Europeans need to carry out new missions? As said earlier, the answer is that three new capabilities seem especially important in strategic terms: peace operations, expeditionary operations, and counter-WMD strike missions. In the coming years, NATO will need sufficient forces to carry out serious peace operations and related missions, ranging from a few thousand troops to a full corps. It also will need powerful expeditionary forces: mobile but well-armed ground forces, along with commensurate air and naval assets, that can deploy swiftly and operate decisively in distant serious wars. Finally, it will need the capacity to work with U.S. forces to conduct lethal, defensive and offensive strikes against WMD threats being posed to Europe, the United States, and operating U.S. and NATO forces. In today's setting, the Europeans seem inclined to take peace operations seriously, but their commitment to building better expeditionary forces and counter-WMD strike forces is less certain. This section will address the first two categories, leaving the final category to the next section.

While the DCI is unclear about its ultimate strategic goals in this arena, the Europeans today seem mostly focused on the near-term imperative of creating better forces for peace operations. Their rationale is understandable even if it lacks proper long-term horizons. In today's setting, they find themselves regularly called upon to perform

peacekeeping, but lacking sufficient forces and rotational assets for the task. Better European peacekeeping forces is a clear need. Creating them is easier and less costly than building better combat forces for major war-fighting. An initial emphasis on peacekeeping allows the Europeans to focus on a feasible task, while presumably setting the stage for bigger ventures later. As a consequence, the EU accord at Helsinki establishes the Headline Goal for creating a swiftly deployable and sustainable European corps of light forces of about 60,000 troops, one that can handle missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement. These units are to be backed by sufficient manpower elsewhere to provide a rotational base for an extended stay lasting months. Creating this corps would provide better peace operations assets for use not only by the EU, but by NATO as well. It also could reduce demand on U.S. forces for peace operations in and around Europe.

Regardless of whether peace operations forces are built by the EU or NATO, success at this endeavor should not be taken for granted. Typically tense situations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, are best calmed by light infantry forces backed by some armor, artillery, and attack helicopters: the kind of forces normally needed to separate warring ethnic groups and enforce the peace. But once major fighting has been halted, the enduring business of peacekeeping is often just begun. What then comes is a set of demanding missions requiring highly specialized capabilities: e.g., military police, medical support, units for restoring electrical power and sanitation, construction engineers capable of rebuilding roads and bridges, and administrative personnel for establishing government and rule of law. These special capabilities normally are not provided, in sufficient amounts, by light infantry forces that are designed to wage war, not help rebuild a devastated countryside. These special assets must be created by conscious planning. The Europeans should be encouraged to create them.

As a properly construed peacekeeping capability is being established by 2003 or so, the Europeans also would be well-advised to work harder on assembling heavy forces that can be employed to carry out major expeditionary missions. For example, the EU could create a single corps headquarters that, by varying its force mix, could perform either peace operations or major warfighting missions depending upon the situation. This flexible corps, perhaps supported by the Eurocorps, could be allocated to NATO in crises where it decides to act, or used by the EU in situations where NATO exercises the right of first refusal. Apparently, the Europeans plan to earmark about 100,000 extra troops to provide a rotational base for the peace operations corps of 60,000. They could better invest this extra manpower in heavier expeditionary units. A rotational base can be created by relying upon an individual replacement system, not units, that draws upon manpower from the entire force structure.

Although the EU's ultimate agenda for ESDP remains to be seen, the reality is that the bulk of European preparations for major war-fighting missions will be driven by strategic guidance coming from NATO headquarters. NATO may elect to respond favorably to growing calls for a Transport Command and a Strike Command: both sensible steps. Regardless of its institutional arrangements, NATO's most important task is to decide upon the force levels that will be needed in order to be prepared for new missions. Its immediate priority will be to ensure that its single ARRC, with four divisions, can be deployed promptly with light or heavy forces for the full spectrum of missions ahead. But it must also grapple

with the thorny issue of whether, over the long haul, its current posture of only two projection-oriented corps--the ARRC and a separate U.S. corps--are enough to meet its enduring requirements. Sober analysis of the strategic realities ahead suggests that this is not the case.

Several reasons underscore the judgment that bigger NATO expeditionary forces will be needed for new missions. One consideration is that a full complement of U.S. reinforcements might not always be available if U.S. global missions elsewhere result in major force commitments. In this event, NATO could be left with the ARRC, supported by air and naval forces, as its sole military response. A second consideration is that some contingencies requiring NATO's involvement could necessitate commitment of more than one corps: indeed, defense of Turkey, an Article 5 mission, likely would require two NATO reinforcing corps against a major invasion. A third consideration is that NATO might find itself facing concurrent contingencies: two crises occurring in overlapping time frames. Concern about simultaneous contingencies is articulated in NATO's strategic guidance to its subordinate commands and member nations. NATO's vulnerability to simultaneous crises is already apparent. With large forces already committed to peacekeeping in the Balkans, it would be hard-pressed to deal with a second contingency. The difficulty would be further-compounded if U.S. reinforcements are not fully available.

The recent experience in Kosovo underscores the need for the Europeans to have a larger number of ready ground combat forces--beyond U.S. and British troops. NATO's air campaign was able to compel the Serbs to leave Kosovo, and although European peacekeepers were slow to fully deploy, they ultimately did arrive in adequate strength. But what would have happened if NATO had been required to insert large ground forces to fight combat missions? Perhaps the Serbian Army would have retreated rather than fight well-armed NATO forces. But had the Serbs chosen to fight and committed their full strength, NATO might have been compelled to send large forces itself: perhaps one or two corps with mechanized and armored units. In all likelihood, most European countries would not have been able to contribute significantly because their forces are not sufficiently ready, and they lack both adequate transport and logistics support. As was the case in the Persian Gulf war, U.S. and British troops, along with some French, would have been compelled to carry out the bulk of the fighting and dying. NATO's embarrassment, and Europe's, would have been compounded because in contrast to 1991, this ground campaign would have been waged on the continent of Europe itself. Serbia is a small country, the size of Belgium. What will happen if, sometime in the future, NATO is compelled to fight a bigger and more determined country, or merely two Serbias at once?

The case for a second, adequately-ready ARRC corps of European forces, backed up by adequate air and naval forces, seems compelling. Indeed, a strong case can be made for a third corps. Perhaps one of these formations can be supplied by the EU corps or the Eurocorps if they are capable of a full-spectrum response. Regardless, the combination of three corps of mostly European forces, supplemented by a U.S. reinforcing corps, would provide NATO sufficient assets for dealing with the challenges ahead. At least one or two NATO divisions should be sufficiently ready to be deployed within a few days of call-up. A full NATO corps should be deployable within 2-4 weeks. The other two corps should be deployable within 1-2 months. An elevated, but staggered, readiness profile of this sort

would be a big improvement over today's situation of lower responsiveness, and it would enable NATO to react with alacrity when emergencies occur. A NATO posture of three European corps would generate a requirement for nine divisions. A larger pool of twelve divisions might be needed in order to provide an adequate mix of heavy and light forces that could be tailored to meet the shifting demands of crises.

A sensible concept would be for NATO to be able to deploy either two light corps and one heavy corps, or one light corps and two heavy corps. Appropriate strike aircraft, naval combatants, and other assets also would be needed to support either option or a mix of them. A NATO posture of twelve divisions, with sufficient command assets to handle nine of them, would be enough to fulfill this concept's emphasis on flexibility and adaptability. Even without major U.S. reinforcements, NATO could conduct two concurrent peace operations, and still possess a single strike corps for an emergency. Alternatively, it could conduct a single peace operation, and have two strike corps for use separately or in combination. The addition of U.S. reinforcements would further broaden NATO's options, to include waging major theater campaigns of Desert Storm-variety outside its borders. The United States, of course, would continue to provide the bulk of carrier assets for maritime missions because the Europeans will not posses the requisite capabilities in numbers or quality.

Even a large pool of twelve divisions would consume only about one-half of Europe's active ground forces, and a similar number of air and naval forces. Thus, a NATO posture of three deployable corps and twelve available divisions is a feasible proposition. The forces themselves already exist. The task is merely one of making them capable for performing new missions. If NATO acts in a phased manner, this goal can be accomplished during the coming decade. As NATO makes its existing ARRC effective, it can begin creating the second corps, and later establish a third corps. The resulting forces would normally be assigned to NATO, but in an emergency, they could be withdrawn and used by their parent nations, or by the EU, or by informal coalitions. Thus, the effect would be to enhance Europe's security in multiple ways by providing a wide spectrum of options for applying military power.

Leadership responsibilities for these NATO expeditionary corps should be assigned in a manner that encourages Europe's major powers to participate, and that ensures the forces will always be capable of responding effectively in an emergency. Presumably Britain will want to retain its current command of the existing ARRC. Germany, or even France if it chooses to participate, could command a second corps. Perhaps a scheme can be created whereby command

is rotated among these three powers plus smaller countries, thereby giving all major players an opportunity to command. Regardless, a key point is that although two corps can be stationed in Central Europe in order to draw upon that region's military strengths, a third corps headquarters can be stationed in Turkey or nearby. Doing so would help anchor Turkey firmly in NATO, draw neighboring countries into the power-projection enterprise, and provide NATO with a badly needed focus on the southern region, where the bulk of future contingencies are likely to occur.

Just as politics and military effectiveness must be taken into account in selecting lead

countries for NATO's corps, the same applies to the forces assigned to each corps. These corps likely will all be multinational: at least two countries will provide the main combat forces, and additional countries might provide support assets. Most likely, each corps will have special responsibility for a specific geographic area or set of missions. The proper goal will be to select members that, for reasons of their national interests, are willing and able to embrace that corps' role in NATO's security strategy, and are fully prepared to carry out NAC decisions. In theory, NATO presumes that security is indivisible, and that all countries participate together in all missions. But in reality, as said earlier, NATO functions on the basis of sub-coalitions of the committed and able. NATO has always acted on the political principle that key roles and missions should be given to countries enthused about them, and that countries unenthused about particular activities should not be expected to participate heavily in them. During the Cold War, for example, Germany led the way in defending its eastern borders, while France, less committed to forward defense, played the role of providing operational reserves in the rear areas, where its forces could defend against advances on French borders. Likewise, the U.S. and British navies defended the northern Atlantic waters largely alone: not only because they had a strategic interest in doing so, but also because only they had the appropriate blue-water navies.

Clear-eyed geopolitical and military logic will again need to be employed in shaping NATO's corps and other formations for new missions. NATO's leaders will need to insist that security is indivisible even for operations outside NATO's borders. Widespread political support will always be an appropriate standard for judging the wisdom and feasibility of such operations. When these operations are launched, NATO cannot afford to sanction a practice whereby some countries regularly shirk duties by passing them to others. But the stance of alliance-wide participation cannot be carried to the point where NATO's effectiveness in operations is compromised because--for political or military reasons--forces from the wrong countries are positioned at the wrong place, at the wrong time. As was the case during the Cold War, striking a wise balance in this arena will be one of the most important challenges facing NATO. The challenge will be one of ensuring that in each mission-area, an effective sub-coalition is created, while overall, the burdens and responsibilities are shared fairly.

Although NATO can create headquarters staffs and provide strategic guidance, Europe's countries will be responsible for ensuring that their individual ground, air, and naval forces are adequately prepared for new missions. As reflected in its recent defense review, Britain is playing a lead role in trying to fulfill this responsibility. Its concept is to become capable of projecting a joint posture of about 50,000 troops, composed of either a heavy division or a light division, supplemented by modern strike aircraft and naval combatants that include bigger carriers than now. It is now restructuring its forces to fit this design. France seems to have a similar concept in mind for its restructured posture: about 50,000 troops, with a heavy or light division plus combat aircraft and naval combatants. Germany's current attitude is more tentative, but its defense ministry has plans to follow suit, again with a model of 50,000 troops from all services and the flexibility to go heavy or light. Italy and the Netherlands also are taking initial steps to prepare their forces through innovative departures. Eventually other countries are likely to follow the example set by the major powers, provided they deliver on their promises. The amount of forces contributed by each country will depend upon its size and resources, but if the example being set by the big

powers is followed, the European countries together will provide about 350,000-400,000 troops: in the ballpark of meeting NATO's needs.

Among Europe's big powers, Britain initiated the process of reform for new missions with its *Strategic Defense Review* (SDR) of 1998. The SDR announced creation of deployable Joint Force Headquarters and Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. The British army will retain two combat divisions, with the capacity to mount simultaneously two brigade-sized operations in high intensity combat. The navy is to shrink from 58 combatants to 53, but it is to acquire medium-sized aircraft carriers to replace today's three small models, and it is to buy additional cruise missiles, better amphibious assault ships, and other advanced weaponry. The air force is to decline from 277 to 241 combat aircraft, but modernize with the Eurofighter, modern missiles, and more transport aircraft. The guiding idea is to create a somewhat smaller, but more-mobile and better-equipped posture for new missions, including power projection outside Europe. [xxvi]

France's defense review is less clear, but its general direction is toward greater downsizing of its larger forces: 317,000 troops versus Britain's 210,000. In recent years, France has been scaling back its once-large ground forces for continental operations, while maintaining a Rapid Reaction Force of paratroops, marines, light armor, and airmobile units. A streamlined and modernized reaction posture will form France's force for new missions, supplemented by France's large air force of 530 combat aircraft and navy of 55 combatants, including a medium-sized carrier. Germany's defense posture of 335,000 troops remains an anomaly. Unlike Britain and France, its navy of 29 combatants lack a blue-water capability, and its air force is not projection-oriented. Although Germany commits a division to NATO's reaction forces, its large army of 21 mobilizable brigades remains mostly allocated to continental missions, focused on the northern European plain. Owing to Germany's recent defense review, this large army likely will be downsized, but the exact amount and its future orientation are unclear. If Germany can succeed in orienting a large portion of its seven fully active brigades to projection missions, plus commensurate air forces, this step would greatly enhance Europe's capacity for new missions, while providing an example for smaller countries to follow. If these countries, in turn, can each prepare a division or a brigade for power projection, plus similar air and naval forces, the combined effect would be cumulative, resulting in a far-better European and NATO posture overall.

At the moment, improvement plans exist mostly on paper. Whether they are brought to life by each country will depend upon public support, governmental policies, adequate budgets, and the capacity of defense ministries to embrace innovation. Not only must new force structures be pursued, but painful steps will have to be taken to diminish reliance on conscription in favor of manning European militaries more heavily with professional soldiers and volunteers. None of these steps are easy, and some of them are not welcomed by influential political actors in all countries. Clearly the United States and NATO will need to continue applying pressure on national capitals. With it, the most likely prospect is that progress will unfold slowly in the near future, but gradually gather momentum as supports builds and the positive benefits become evident. For the moment, the fact that paper plans exist at all, and that many defense ministries are catching the spirit, are encouraging signs.

If the Europeans are to succeed, however, their preparedness measures cannot be purely national. In important ways, the Europeans will need to pursue multinational integration of their forces. Whether this integration is pursued under NATO's flag or the EU's flag, or preferably both, matters less than ensuring it is accomplished. The Cold War was big enough to permit national planning of combat forces and logistics. In Central Europe, each country provided one or more national corps, each of which was assigned a separate mission in the strategy of forward defense and flexible response. For NATO, the task largely was ensuring that these large formations merely were compatible: i.e., capable of fighting alongside each other. The new missions ahead will demand a different, more demanding response. National forces will need to be not only compatible, but also fully interoperable, and indeed, interchangeable. That is, they will be required to blend together in close ways that regularly exchange services yet result in no loss of combat power. As already being experienced in the Balkans, most new missions will be carried out by multinational corps and logistic support structures, with units drawn from two or more countries. Long-distance transport and supply will be multinational as well. For these reasons, multinational integration will not be a political luxury. It will be a military necessity. [xxvii]

This situation is bringing back to life the original visions of Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, both of whom favored a full-blown European Defense Community (EDC) because it offered the best way for Europeans to meet their defense obligations to NATO. Secretary of State Dulles' famous "agonizing reappraisal" speech was a threat of U.S. withdrawal if the Europeans failed to carry out the EDC. The stance of the U.S. government then stands out in sharp contrast to the attitude of some Americans today, who express nervousness that the Europeans, in fact, will finally unify. In the mid-1950s, the United States settled for a national approach to defense planning only because France's parliament vetoed the EDC. The old-style national approach is now being replaced by a reborn military need for multinational integration. NATO initiated this process by forming several multinational corps when the Cold War ended, but it has not yet taken this measure to its next plateau: becoming fully prepared for new missions outside NATO's borders. Fortunately, Europe's quest for unification and an ESDP translates into support for this idea. Given this, the challenge facing the United States is to support it as well: not merely because the Europeans favor it politically, but also because it is a viable way--perhaps the only viable way--for NATO to become effective at using small national contributions to generate large, effective forces. Clearly Europe's quest for political unity and military bonding cannot be allowed to come at the expense of an effective NATO under U.S. leadership. Just as clearly, a militarily effective NATO capable of working closely with U.S. forces will not be possible unless the Europeans succeed in healthy ways.

A short while ago, U.S. policy toward ESDP was guided by the three D's: no discrimination, no decoupling, no duplication. While this mantra aptly expressed the negative outcomes that the United States wanted to avoid, it said nothing about the positive steps that the Europeans should be taking, and that the United States should support. Since then, NATO Secretary General Robertson has offered a new mantra of positive goals: indivisibility, improved capability, and inclusiveness. His mantra provides a clarion call for guiding how the United States, NATO, and the ESDP can cooperatively work together in the coming years.

Program Priorities for Critical Capabilities

Creating appropriate force structures is merely the first step toward building an adequate NATO posture for new missions. Another, equally important step is endowing these forces with the proper capabilities so that they can deploy swiftly and strike effectively. When the DCI was announced, it included five broad categories: 1.) deployability and mobility; 2.) sustainability and logistics; 3.) effective engagement; 4.) survivability of forces and infrastructure; and 5.) C4I systems. These broad categories were then spelled out in more detail to include fully 58 separate sub-measures for the near-term and long-term. The appearance of this many sub-measures is hardly surprising. The DCI aims to be reasonably comprehensive, and it is not unreasonably large: DoD's FYDP contains over 200 such categories. Yet, a properly big plan can result in loss of focus on how to establish clear priorities for critical capabilities. The DCI should take special care to urge the Europeans to pursue important capabilities that their normal planning, if left to its own devices, will not automatically create. This analysis points to three capabilities that deserve special emphasis because they are key to helping DCI create improved forces for new missions:

1. Strategic mobility assets for ensuring that European forces can be transported swiftly to crisis zones, without drawing heavily on U.S. assets.

2. Long-distance logistics assets for properly supporting European forces once they arrive at the scene.

3. C4ISR assets and smart munitions so that they can carry out modern doctrine with U.S. forces and perform strike operations effectively. Two kinds of different assets are needed: medium-technology assets for traditional battlefield operations, and sophisticated high-technology assets for counter-WMD strike missions.

In addressing NATO's mobility needs, a natural inclination is to urge European militaries to purchase big, wide-bodied air transports: e.g., the C-17 or a future European transport. Today, Europe's air mobility assets are limited mostly to C-130's and C-160's, which carry only 10 tons apiece and are not well-endowed for long-range missions. By contrast, jumbo transports carry 80-100 tons apiece, can haul outsize and oversize cargoes, and have faster speed and longer range. A single wing of 18 big transports could haul about 800 tons daily to a long distance outside Europe. This wing could deploy a light battalion, or support assets for 1-2 fighter wings, to a crisis location in a few days, or play a big role in sustaining the daily needs of an already-deployed peacekeeping corps. Yet there are limits on how far this worthy idea should be pursued. Such transports are expensive: up to $200 million apiece to buy and fly. A large transport force is not affordable, and a few aircraft would make only a small dent in Europe's needs. By comparison, the U.S. airlift capacity, provided by 585 big transports, is nearly 25,000 tons per day. The United States has acquired this much capability because ground forces equipped for major combat are quite heavy. A single armored division weighs fully 120,000 tons. A three-division corps, with its logistic support and stocks, weighs a million tons. Europe does not need to match the United States, but it does need enough airlift capacity to help transport forces of this size or greater.

A better idea is for Europe to mimic the U.S. practice of relying heavily on its civilian cargo airlift fleet. Owing to its inexpensive CRAF program, the U.S. military can quickly mobilize a large number of heavy civilian transports, which play a major role in its total airlift capacity. The cost of a similar program in Europe would be well-less than a small fleet of military-owned transports, and its capacity to lift cargo would be considerably greater. A moderate civilian transport fleet would be composed of 60-80 aircraft. It could airlift about 2700-3600 tons daily. A larger fleet of 150-200 aircraft could lift 6700-8900 tons daily. Both options are feasible in the sense that Europe's civilian airlines possess this many big transports. Both options would provide Europe with a more serious airlift capacity, one commensurate with their military requirements for power projection.[xxviii]

An equally attractive option would be for Europe to mobilize its commercial sealift fleet, in the manner done by the United States. A single modern cargo ship (e.g., a Ro-Ro ship or a container ship) can carry 10,000-20,000 tons of cargo. A fleet of about 100 ships could lift an entire heavy corps, plus its sustaining stocks and supplies for air forces, in a single sailing. A fleet of 200 ships could lift two corps plus stocks and supplies. Such a fleet could load, sail to Turkey or a nearby location, and unload in three weeks or so. Europe has ready access to this many cargo ships, and creating a mobilizable fleet under government contract would be inexpensive. Indeed, Europe could create, at affordable expense, a fleet of both civilian air transport and commercial cargo ships. This would be the best option of all. The air transports could speed the deployment of 75,000-190,000 tons of high-priority cargo in the period before cargo ships arrive with their larger loads. In this manner, Europe could create an early airlift capability, backed up by a big sealift capability that, together, would greatly enhance its capacity swiftly to project military power. The DCI already endorses this idea, and U.S. spokesmen have called attention to it. The challenge is for European countries to take advantage of a cheap and effective way to enter seriously the power projection game.

A vigorous strategic mobility program will go for naught unless the Europeans also develop better logistic support assets for long-distance military operations in austere settings. Logistic support is the unglamorous and easily neglected stepchild of sound defense planning. Yet it is hugely important. A U.S. Army corps, for example, will have about 50,000 troops assigned to its three divisions and another 20,000 troops in other combat formations, but it also will come equipped with 30,000 troops performing logistic support and related missions. Several thousand additional logistics troops will be stationed farther to the rear, transiting supplies and replacement equipment forward. These logistics support assets are critically important to the corps' effectiveness in combat, especially beyond the first few days. Indeed, a large combat force, without adequate logistics support, would be hard-pressed to move cross-country from ports to battle zones with sufficient speed. More time could be lost offloading at ports and moving across an unprepared infrastructure than is consumed in deploying the forces from their home bases, across large waters, to the crisis region.

Today European forces possess logistic support assets, but normally not the kind needed to provide the types of support uniquely needed in power-projection missions. Their logistics assets are typically designed to provide support for local border defense missions. This means that their supply lines are normally short, and they can take advantage of a well-

prepared transportation infrastructure plus commercial oil pipes, gas lines, storage areas, construction engineers, civilian mechanics, and local hospitals. Always attempting to economize, most European militaries created lean logistic support structures that were tailored to the local situation and therefore did not possess the additional assets that would be needed if their forces were deployed elsewhere. During the Persian Gulf war, even the British and French, Europe's best at power projection, were compelled to turn toward U.S. forces for major logistic support. The era of being able to rely upon U.S. forces for this support is coming to an end. U.S. forces might not always be present in large numbers, and in any event, they are striving to make their logistics assets leaner in ways that inevitably will reduce their ability to support others.

The act of creating better European logistic support requires careful attention to new details, but it is a readily doable proposition. It requires gathering already-existing, but widely scattered manpower and assets in order to form new units in the various categories of logistic support. It mandates the training of new specialties among soldiers and airmen. It necessitates the purchase of new but relatively cheap equipment: e.g., cargo trucks, road graders, bulldozers, mobile maintenance gear, fuel bladders, and medical supplies. If these steps are taken, the Europeans likely could double their ability to deploy forces swiftly, and double their combat power once they arrive. In addition to creating better strategic mobility, a more cost-effective program for the Europeans is hard to imagine.

Strategic mobility and logistic support are both areas where the Europeans can pursue multinational integration to great advantage. A multinational transport force would enable individual European countries to project military power by drawing upon a common pool of assets. The result will be a better capacity for multiple countries to deploy forces in well-planned and choreographed ways: a great improvement over national transportation efforts that likely will be ineffective and, at best, will result in all forces clumsily arriving at a crisis spot too late to be on time. A multinational logistics force would enable European forces to share support assets in response to the ebbs and flows of combat. It would also enable the Europeans to economize on logistic support, rather than compelling all countries to create bloated structures that can handle all possible contingencies in battle. The result will be a leaner logistic support structure coupled with combat forces that can operate more effectively. These two behind-the-scenes areas offer the Europeans an inexpensive and highly productive way to unify, regardless of whether this step is taken through NATO, the EU, or both.

In today's setting, a lengthy period of six months and perhaps considerably longer would be required for the Europeans to deploy 2-3 corps to a long distance on Europe's periphery or beyond. This period is far too long for NATO's effectiveness and Europe's safety. As discussed earlier, the act of creating and making ready additional NATO corps for new missions would reduce this time appreciably. So would the transport and logistic support measures examined here. The compound effect in all three areas could enable NATO to deploy these forces much faster: in three months or less. The difference could be critical in strategic terms. The big payoff makes the step well-worth the modest expense.

Even as the Europeans acquire a better capacity to deploy and support forces at crisis

spots, they also will need to develop the capability to carry out modern doctrine with U.S. forces for traditional battlefield operations. The U.S. pursuit of the RMA creates the worrisome prospect that if progress is not made, a great gulf will emerge between U.S. and European forces: perhaps so great that combined operations will not be possible even if political leaders order them to be carried out. The Europeans have work to do in this arena. But again, sufficient progress is an affordable and doable proposition. The Europeans will not need to mimic U.S. forces in high technology and modern doctrine. Instead, they will need to achieve complementarity: the capacity to operate together as part of the same team.

The United States and the Europeans can bring somewhat different levels of technical and doctrinal prowess, and still work together by blending their respective assets to create a sensible distribution of battlefield roles and missions. This practice was successfully pursued in the Persian Gulf war. During the Kosovo conflict, U.S. and European air operations showed a high degree of interoperability and mutual support. This legacy provides a model upon which to build. The Europeans will not need to master modern doctrine. They merely will need to get into the doctrinal ballpark in solid ways. European air forces will need to retain the capacity to work with U.S. air forces as they develop an improved capacity to strike deep, precisely, and in near-real time. European ground forces will need to stay abreast of the U.S. Army and Marines as they become better at moving swiftly across the battlefield, firing at long range, and destroying the enemy with combined arms operations. European navies will need to help support the U.S. Navy as its capacity grows for the networked application of modern firepower at long ranges. Above all, European forces will need to improve at conducting joint operations in the form of swift deployments followed by powerful strikes aimed at winning quickly and decisively. These goals may sound daunting, but when the details are considered, the Europeans can attain them if they focus on the right cost-effective programs. After all, the Europeans themselves are not coming out of the Stone Age.[xxix]

The Europeans mostly will not need to buy new weapons platforms in order to plant themselves firmly in the doctrinal ballpark. For the most part, their current weapons--including tanks, IFVs, and combat aircraft--are good enough. Indeed, some are superior to U.S. weapons. German artillery is a good example, and there are others. The Europeans will need better, affordable air assets in some special areas: e.g., JSTARS, defense suppression, electronic warfare, search and rescue, reconnaissance and surveillance, UAVs, and all-weather, day-night strike systems. They also will need modern information networks and better smart munitions. Ideally, they should procure advanced U.S.-produced information systems, ground surveillance monitors, and such latest-generation munitions as BAT, SKEET, JDAM, SADARM, and advanced cruise missiles. Many of these expensive systems may not be affordable or even releasable to the Europeans. If so, the Europeans likely can get by with their own information systems and grids, provided they are interoperable with U.S. systems. The same judgment applies to smart munitions. If the Europeans are using an older generation of these munitions, they might not be able to strike and destroy targets with the proficiency of U.S. forces. But if their proficiency is sufficient to maintain operational tempo with U.S. forces, it likely will be good enough. Ideally the Europeans should have the best technology available, but if the best they can achieve is medium-quality information systems and munitions, this can still make a potent combination: good enough

to work effectively with U.S. forces.

In order to make proper use of medium-technology assets, the Europeans will need to practice at the new doctrines of near-real time air targeting, dispersed ground forces, swift maneuvers, and integrated naval fire support now appearing in joint U.S. doctrine. Collectively these doctrines mean that a new mentality for waging war is being developed. On the battlefield, time is compressing and space is enlarging. Force structures are destined to change along with it. Irrespective of their weapons and forces, the Europeans need to understand this mentality, and be able to function within it. They can develop this new mentality only if they practice at carrying out new doctrines through training and exercises. Funding adequate training regimes is the responsibility of the Europeans. But the United States can help them by making the necessary knowledge and information available to them. U.S. forces stationed in Europe are a natural instrument for carrying out this agenda.

Whereas medium-technology systems will suffice for traditional battlefield operations, they likely will not suffice for counter-WMD strike missions. This is the case both for ballistic missile defense and for offensive strike assets. These missions do not require large forces. But they do require special high-technology capabilities to strike swiftly and precisely at long distances. Typically, latest-generation cruise missiles are used for offensive missions, along with combat aircraft capable of finding moving targets and destroying them with one pass. Specialized ground forces also can be required. The United States has been working hard to create these capabilities, but the Europeans are lagging far behind. For political and military reasons, a situation cannot be allowed to evolve in which the United States specializes in these missions but the Europeans contribute little.

This especially will be the case if strategic conditions mandate that Europe's safety in the WMD-era requires both a missile defense screen around its exposed periphery and counter-WMD strike assets for long-range offensive operations. The United States could find itself responsible for providing both assets while the Europeans neither contribute forces nor are sufficiently involved in crisis planning to know how to act, or even how to judge U.S. actions. An outcome this imbalanced could pose a dagger at the heart of NATO's military effectiveness and political cohesion. Only the future can determine what lies ahead in the missile defense arena. For now, the judgment can confidently be offered that the Europeans should acquire a sufficient amount of the high-technology assets needed to help perform counter-WMD strike operations alongside U.S. forces. For reasons of its own strategic interests, the United States should help them: not only in this arena, but on their entire defense agenda as well.

As for missile defense, American public attention has focused largely on whether to build a BMD system to protect the continental United States. But the Department of Defense is also pursuing a vigorous Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD) system that likely will play a role in determining how Europe is protected. The TAMD program includes lower-tier systems, including the Patriot PAC-3 and the Navy's Area Defense system, and upper-tier systems, including THAAD and the Navy Theater Wide program. Other measures include an airborne laser for engaging missiles in the boost phase of flight, and defensive systems against cruise missiles. The guiding concept is an integrated family of systems. As it is deployed, it will acquire a growing capability to protect U.S. and allied forces, and to help

defend continental Europe as well.

In Europe, the idea of fielding ballistic missile defenses is controversial. In recent years, however, NATO has begun studying the issue and the options available to it. NATO's new Strategic Concept points to the growing threat posed by WMD proliferation. The Washington Summit of 1999 reached agreement on the need to develop active and passive measures to protect NATO forces and infrastructure. In late 1999, a trilateral U.S.-German-Dutch TMD planning cell was created for analyzing extended air defense and interoperability of Patriot forces. The United States, Germany, and Italy are also pursuing a restructured version of the MEADS program, focusing on a risk-reduction effort that builds on existing systems, including PAC-3. What the future holds is uncertain. The risk is that NATO will act too slowly and cautiously, in ways that leave deployed forces and continental Europe vulnerable when new threats emerge in a few years. The opportunity is that by working with the United States, Europe can take advantage of emerging technologies to better defend itself. Much will depend not only upon budgets and technological progress, but also on evolving political attitudes and strategic perspectives. Here again, defense cooperation between the United States and Europe holds the key to the future.

Summing Up

Clearly NATO and the well-oiled tradition of transatlantic coalition planning face a demanding agenda of political change and strategic innovation in the years ahead. Whereas NATO once ruled the defense roost alone, now ways will have to be found to blend NATO and the EU's ESDP so that both institutions can work in tandem: in a manner that wisely allocates responsibilities between them and meets the security situation ahead. As this process of political change is occurring, NATO and European military postures will have to be transformed in key ways. The coming era will require new capabilities in three areas: specially designed peacekeeping, traditional warfighting through swift power projection and modern doctrine, and counter-WMD strike operations. If future European forces are to provide these three capabilities, they will need to change in important ways.

Although these challenges are eyebrow-raising, they are manageable. NATO, the United States, and the Europeans have surmounted more demanding challenges before: in fact, several times. The Kosovo conflict confounded critics who dismissed NATO's effectiveness in a war. It showed that NATO could muster the political resolve to employ force against an adversary. It also showed that U.S. and European forces have a well-developed, interoperable capability to work together in combat. The task ahead is not to create a capacity for combined operations out of wholecloth, but instead to preserve an existing capability and to upgrade it to a new era of warfare. The challenge facing the Europeans is far from a hopeless exercise in futility. If they merely make use of the technologies available to them and learn the new doctrines of the information era, they will remain able to operate with U.S. forces. The twofold combination of faster power projection and complementary strike operations is a viable prescription for them to maintain NATO's effectiveness, make the ESDP and EU credible, and safeguard their own interests.

The bottom line is that the Europeans, working through NATO and the EU, will need to employ the resources at their disposal in order to rise to the occasion. But the United

States can do a great deal to help them. It can help by making information systems and munitions available to them, by promoting better transatlantic cooperation among the defense primes and the information technology industry, and by assisting the Europeans as they adopt the new doctrines of the information age. This is how the transatlantic defense partnership worked, at its best, during the Cold War. It needs to work this way again so that both the United States and the Europeans will be capable of jointly performing the new missions ahead.

Endnotes

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[i] The White House, Washington D.C., GPO, 1999

[ii] See David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,, 1964).

[iii] John Bartlett. Familiar Quotations. (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980). For a portrayal of European political psychology before World War I, see Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower. (New York: Bantam Books, 1989).

[iv] CFSP means "Common Foreign and Security Policy"; ESDP, "European Security and Defense Policy". ESDP, which followed CFSP, thus adds defense preparedness to the EU agenda.

[v] For more historical detail, see Richard L. Kugler, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993). For a skeptical analysis of the EMU's future, see Niall Ferguson and Laurence J. Koltkoff, "The Degeneration of EMU." Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000.

[vi] For a related analysis, see Elizabeth Pond, "Come Together." Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000.

[vii] For economic and military details, see IISS, The Military Balance: 1999-2000. (London: Oxford University Press, 1999). For GDP growth rates and similar data, see IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1999; (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1999). For a skeptical analysis of the EMU's future, see Niall Ferguson and Laurence J. Koltkoff, "The Degeneration of EMU." Foreign Affairs, March/April 2000.

[viii] See IISS, Strategic Survey, 1998/99; (London: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[ix] See EU Report, The European Union in 1999. Brussels, 2000.

[x] See EU Report, The European Union in 1999, Brussels, 2000.

[xi] For more historical detail, see Richard L. Kugler, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). See also George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East. (Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1999).

[xii] See EU, General Report, Chapter V: Enlargement; Brussels, 1999.

[xiii] Russia has been invaded several times across the corridors from Europe. Early in its history, the Poles drove to the gates of Moscow. In the early 18th century, Sweden's Charles XII invaded, and was ultimately rebuffed by Peter the Great. In the early 19th century, Napoleon invaded, and seized Moscow before being forced to retreat by winter weather. In 1941, Hitler's Germany invaded, driving to Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad before being pushed back. For this reason, a consistent principle of Russian foreign policy has been to maintain a buffer zone on its western borders.

[xiv] See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

[xv] For an appraisal of how population settlement patterns affected the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War. (New York: Random House, 1998).

[xvi]See Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century; (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[xvii] For analysis, see: Robert D. Blackwell and Michael Sturmer (ed.), Allies Divided: transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

[xviii] Good books on NATO secure and defense affairs include: Philip H. Gordon. NATO's Transformation-The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance. (New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 1997) and David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's Roles in International Security. (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1998).

[xix] For related analyses, see Philip Gordon, "Their Own Army?" Foreign Affairs, July/August, 2000. John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft, "Saving NATO's Foundation." Foreign Affairs November/December 1999.

[xx] Source: IISS Military Balance, 1999-2000 (UK: Randor, 1999).

[xxi] For more detail, see Richard L. Kugler, The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Forces and Requirements in the Post-Cold War Era. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992).

[xxii] See Secretary of Defense Cohen's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000. (Washington, D.C: GPO, 2000). For a critical review of the RMA, see Michael O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare. (Brookings: Washington, DC, 2000).

[xxiii] For more detail, see Richard L. Kugler, U.S.-West European Cooperation in Out-of-Area Military Operations: Problems and Prospects. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994).

[xxiv] See NATO Military Handbook, Brussels, 1998.

[xxv] For key documents, see; NATO Press Releases, "Defense Capabilities Initiative" and " The Alliance's Strategic Concept," (Washington Summit, Washington, D.C., April, 1999).

[xxvi] For a portrayal of Britain's response, see Michael O'Neal, "U.K. Defense Policy: Modern Forces for the Modern World." Strategic Forum #157 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

[xxvii] For details, see NATO Logistic Handbook, Brussels, 1997.

[xxviii] For information in airlift and sealift planning factors, see DoD's Deployment Planning Guide; Military Traffic Management Command, Newport News, VA, 1994.

[xxix] For more detail, See David Gompert, Richard Kugler, and Martin Libiki: Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).